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8 commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
mithral
3207b89205 Add a TMDB provider for video: films and television
Five providers existed and none covered the "video" kind, so every movie
and show got a title from its filename and nothing else - no poster, no
plot, no cast, no year. That is the gap between "a folder of videos with a
nice web UI" and a media server.

TMDB keeps films and television in separate namespaces behind separate
endpoints, and a Query does not say which one it is. Rather than guessing
from the title, Search asks both at once and merges by TMDB popularity,
which is the only ranking signal available without a second request per
item.

Speed is the point, so the two requests run concurrently over one derived
context on a single shared client, and whichever fails first cancels the
other: one dead endpoint cannot hold the result hostage while the healthy
one is waited out. Verified red-green - serialising the two fetches makes
TestTMDBSearchesConcurrently fail at 2s.

Two corrections made in review, both found by reading the code rather than
trusting the report:

1. ExternalID was the bare TMDB id, so film 603 and show 603 - different
   works - would have been stored identically in provider_ids. Namespaced
   as movie/603 and tv/603. Nothing resolves an item from an external_id
   today, so this was latent rather than broken, but the table is populated
   as enrichment runs and correcting it later would have needed a data
   migration. Pinned by TestTMDBExternalIDIsNamespaced.

2. Query.Year was added but never populated, so the year filter - the main
   way to tell a remake from the original - never applied. catalog.Item
   already carried Year; the enricher now passes it.

No cover bytes are fetched here: the provider returns image URLs and the
existing enricher caches what it uses. A missing key logs the env var and
skips, so the feature is discoverable from the boot log.

Not verified: the live TMDB API. Tests run against httptest servers only.
2026-10-12 01:17:48 -04:00
mithral
795b77b709 Advertise Vellum over mDNS so clients find it without a typed URL
internal/discovery registers three service types on the listen port:
_vellum._tcp for native clients, and _jellyfin._tcp / _subsonic._tcp
because those ecosystems already have clients that browse the LAN. That
last part is the point: Infuse, Jellyfin Media Player and Symfonium can
find Vellum with no client-side work, because they are already looking for
those names.

TXT records carry api, ver, proto, types, tls and (when set) pub, so a
client that resolves one can tell what it found before connecting.

Definitions is a pure function of config and Start only registers what it
returns, so what is advertised is testable without a socket.

Two behaviours worth knowing:
- VELLUM_DISCOVERY=off stops advertising. It accepts off/no/false/0;
  strconv.ParseBool would have silently ignored "off".
- A loopback-only listen address advertises nothing. That is the normal
  shape behind a reverse proxy, and advertising it would put a port in the
  LAN browse list that refuses every client that dials it. Verified
  red-green: defeating the guard fails TestDefinitionsSkipsLoopbackListen.

zeroconf is the only new dependency. It logs to the stdlib logger, so a
host with no multicast-capable interface prints to stderr outside slog.

Not verified: real mDNS on a real LAN. There is no multicast here, so the
wire behaviour of zeroconf is untested - only the definitions it is handed.
2026-10-12 01:04:33 -04:00
mithral
87c17d4854 Make the login limiter correct behind a reverse proxy
Some checks failed
CI / ci (push) Has been cancelled
ClientIP used r.RemoteAddr and ignored X-Forwarded-For. That was right
about not trusting the header from an untrusted peer, but it is only half
the design: behind a proxy every request arrives from the proxy, so the
limiter key in handlers.go was "<proxy-ip>|<username>" for every client on
the internet. One attacker locked out a username for everyone, an attacker
rotating usernames never hit a limit, and sessions.ip recorded the proxy
so the device list was useless.

- VELLUM_TRUSTED_PROXIES is a CIDR list. X-Forwarded-For is honoured only
  when RemoteAddr is inside it, and the chain is walked right-to-left so
  the first address that is not itself a trusted proxy wins. Everything to
  its left was appended by a client we do not control, so a spoofed
  leftmost entry is discarded.
- VELLUM_PUBLIC_URL is the external origin. CookieSecure now defaults to
  true when it is https://, so a TLS deployment that forgets
  VELLUM_COOKIE_SECURE no longer ships a plaintext session cookie.
- A malformed CIDR fails the boot rather than being skipped: silently
  dropping a proxy network widens the trust boundary, which is the exact
  failure this setting exists to prevent.

ClientIP became a method on Authenticator so it can see the trusted set,
which is why handlers.go and main.go changed as well.

Verified red-green: neutering the trusted-peer path fails five ClientIP
tests, including the spoofed-leftmost case.

Known gap, pre-existing and not fixed here: this limiter still covers only
/api/v1/auth/login. Jellyfin AuthenticateByName and Subsonic auth call
auth.Authenticate with no limiting, so the same brute force is available
through those two surfaces.
2026-10-12 00:45:27 -04:00
mithral
051169a18a Documentation, and make a fresh clone actually work
Docs
- docs/ARCHITECTURE.md: how the pieces fit and why. The request path, the six
  enforced layers, the data model, the scanner, the job queue, direct-play
  playback, and the three protocol surfaces over one application.
- docs/decisions/: seven ADRs with the alternatives that were rejected —
  SQLite-with-a-seam, direct-play-only, mark-missing-never-delete, the modular
  monolith, the one item-access chokepoint, the table-backed queue, and
  fixed-width timestamps.
- README: the layout section was stale (it predated catalog, home, scanner,
  providers, engine, probe, playback, apitoken, arch and the dto packages) and
  now lists what exists, plus links to the new docs.

Two real bugs, both found by verifying the docs instead of trusting them

1. The CLI could not run on a fresh install. `Config.Validate` created the data
   and config directories, but the CLI never called it, so `vellum user add` —
   the recovery path when you are locked out — failed with "unable to open
   database file" until the server had booted at least once. Split the directory
   creation into `Config.EnsureDirs`, call it from the CLI, and keep the media
   root check out of it: an admin command must not fail because a library is
   unmounted. The CLI tests now point DBPath inside DataDir, exactly as
   LoadConfig derives it, so they exercise the fresh-install path; removing
   EnsureDirs fails three of them.

2. A fresh clone could not build at all. `//go:embed all:dist` fails to compile
   when web/dist is absent, and web/.gitignore expected a `dist/.gitkeep` that
   was never created. Added it, so a clone builds and the server logs
   "web UI not embedded; run the frontend build to include it" — the intended
   behaviour for someone who only wants the API.

Also: the httpapi tests depended on a built frontend and FAILED rather than
skipping, so the suite was red on any fresh clone. findAsset and readAsset now
skip with a message naming the missing step. They still RUN when a bundle is
present (verified: zero skips here), so they have not been quietly disabled.

Verified from a simulated clone of tracked files only: go build exit 0, 25
packages pass, the server boots and applies all 12 migrations, and the CLI
creates a user and takes a backup. gofmt clean, vet exit 0, svelte-check 0/0.
2026-10-12 00:18:11 -04:00
mithral
b82090ed29 Phase 7: games — ROM scanning, platforms, cloud saves, EmulatorJS
The RomM replacement.

- registry: a games media type with ~35 ROM extensions across NES, SNES, GB/GBA,
  N64, NDS, Genesis/Master System/Game Gear, PC Engine, Neo Geo Pocket,
  WonderSwan, Atari, Coleco, Intellivision, and PlayStation.
- games: platform detection from the file extension, mapping each to an
  EmulatorJS core. Platforms with no browser core are recognised but marked
  not-playable so the UI offers a download instead of a broken player.
- migration 0005: game_saves keyed by (user, item, slot). Save states are user
  data, not media — two people playing the same ROM keep their own progress.
- save endpoints with a 16 MiB cap and a validated slot name; the upload is
  read through a LimitReader so an unbounded body is refused rather than
  buffered.
- igdb provider: Twitch client-credentials flow with the token cached for its
  ~2 month lifetime, Apicalypse query body, and cover URLs normalised from
  protocol-relative t_thumb to https t_cover_big.
- searchTitle: strips "(USA)", "[!]", "(Rev 1)" and similar release tags before
  searching. "Sonic the Hedgehog (USA)" matched nothing; "Sonic the Hedgehog"
  matches immediately. Stored titles keep the original.
- web: GamePlayer embeds EmulatorJS and adds Load/Save-to-server buttons.

Verified live against IGDB: Sonic matched (id 316900) with real cover art; a
4 KB save uploaded, listed, downloaded byte-identical, and deleted.
2026-10-09 21:54:49 -04:00
mithral
5a2c3fa090 Comic metadata via ComicVine
- comicvine provider for comics. ComicVine has no keyless tier, so the
  provider is only registered when VELLUM_COMICVINE_API_KEY is set; without it
  the server logs a note and comic enrichment completes as a no-op rather than
  erroring.
- BaseURL is injectable so the response parsing is covered by a test against a
  local server: candidate mapping, the required User-Agent, and the
  status_code=100 invalid-key case (ComicVine returns HTTP 200 for that).
- descriptions are stripped of ComicVine's embedded HTML before storage.

Verified against a fake ComicVine server, and live that a comics library
enriches cleanly with no key configured.
2026-10-09 21:47:51 -04:00
mithral
9772e55c73 Phase 1: accounts, sessions, per-library grants
Multi-user from the first migration, as planned.

- auth: argon2id password hashing (PHC encoded, parameters travel with the
  hash), opaque session tokens stored only as SHA-256, login rate limiting,
  and account enumeration resistance (unknown user hashes anyway)
- sessions: cookie or Bearer auth, HttpOnly + SameSite=Lax, revocation on
  password change
- grants: library_grants is the single access-control chokepoint. Admins see
  every library; everyone else sees exactly their can_read grants
- bootstrap: VELLUM_ADMIN_USER/PASSWORD create the first admin only on an
  empty database. No default password is ever invented.
- httpapi: mounts modules on a shared mux, session middleware innermost
- httpx: shared JSON helpers, strict body decoding

Gate: two users see different libraries. Tests cover that, plus session
expiry, token-at-rest, grant upsert, and the full login/me/logout flow.
2026-10-09 16:31:24 -04:00
mithral
eb1ad6d920 Phase 0: skeleton, config, migrations, health check, container
Bootstraps Vellum as a single Go binary with one SQLite database.

- core: env-driven config, slog logging, SQLite (WAL) with pooled pragmas,
  embedded migration runner keyed on PRAGMA user_version
- migrations/0001_core.sql: identity, media, user state, infra. Media items
  are global; all per-user state (progress, favorites, grants) is a join.
  One polymorphic progress table covers every media kind.
- httpapi: request-ID, structured request logging, panic recovery, JSON
  endpoints for /healthz and /api/v1/version
- multi-arch Dockerfile (pure-Go SQLite, CGO_ENABLED=0) with an entrypoint
  that honours PUID/PGID like the rest of the self-hosted stack
- tests for migration idempotency, FK enforcement, WAL, config, middleware

Media does not exist yet. Nothing is exposed beyond health and version.
2026-10-09 16:26:08 -04:00