Vellum/internal/jellyfin/system.go
mithral 6e04e957b8 Rate limit every surface that checks a password
The limiter covered only /api/v1/auth/login. Jellyfin's AuthenticateByName
and Subsonic's authenticate both called auth.Authenticate with no limiting,
so an attacker brute-forced through those instead: the same password, the
same argon2, no ceiling.

The limiter moves from auth.Handlers onto *Authenticator, which all three
surfaces already hold, so they share one budget and splitting guesses
across surfaces gains nothing. main.go builds one authenticator and hands
it to both compat layers, so the sharing is real rather than intended.

Subsonic needs care: it has no login step, authenticate runs on every
request, so a naive check would charge playback against the login budget
and lock a listener out mid-album. The limiter is consulted only when a
credential was actually supplied, and a success or an uncredentialed
request spends nothing.

Verified red-green on all three: removing the Jellyfin gate fails
TestAuthenticateByNameIsRateLimited with 401 instead of 429; removing the
Subsonic credential guard fails
TestSuccessAndUncredentialedDoNotConsumeTheBudget; neutering AllowLogin or
ResetLogin fails the auth tests.

Known gap, unchanged: the limiter is in-process, so it resets on restart
and does not span replicas. Fine for one binary against one SQLite file.
2026-10-12 00:57:56 -04:00

161 lines
4.5 KiB
Go

package jellyfin
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"net/http"
"github.com/mithral/vellum/internal/apitoken"
"github.com/mithral/vellum/internal/auth"
"github.com/mithral/vellum/internal/httpx"
"github.com/mithral/vellum/internal/jellyfin/dto"
)
func (h *Handlers) handleSystemInfoPublic(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
httpx.WriteJSON(w, http.StatusOK, dto.SystemInfoPublic{
Id: h.serverIDFor(r.Context()),
ServerName: "Vellum",
Version: dto.Version,
ProductName: "Vellum",
OperatingSystem: "Linux",
})
}
func (h *Handlers) handleAuthenticateByName(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
// Deliberately not httpx.DecodeJSON: that rejects unknown fields, and real
// clients add extras. We only read Username and Pw.
var req dto.AuthByNameRequest
if err := json.NewDecoder(http.MaxBytesReader(w, r.Body, 1<<20)).Decode(&req); err != nil {
httpx.WriteError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid request body")
return
}
if req.Username == "" || req.Pw == "" {
httpx.WriteError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "username and password are required")
return
}
ip := h.a.ClientIP(r)
if !h.a.AllowLogin(ip, req.Username) {
// Same wording as the web login: this surface shares its budget, and a
// client cannot tell which one refused it.
h.log.Warn("jellyfin login rate limited", "ip", ip, "username", req.Username)
httpx.WriteError(w, http.StatusTooManyRequests, "too many login attempts, try again later")
return
}
u, err := auth.Authenticate(r.Context(), h.db, req.Username, req.Pw)
if err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, auth.ErrInvalidCredentials) {
// Same message for unknown user and wrong password, as the web
// login does, so usernames are not enumerable.
httpx.WriteError(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "invalid username or password")
return
}
h.fail(w, "authenticate", err)
return
}
h.a.ResetLogin(ip, req.Username)
label := deviceLabel(r)
token, err := apitoken.Mint(r.Context(), h.db, u.ID, apitoken.KindJellyfin, label)
if err != nil {
h.fail(w, "mint token", err)
return
}
dto, err := h.userDTO(r.Context(), u)
if err != nil {
h.fail(w, "build user", err)
return
}
h.log.Info("jellyfin login", "user", u.Username, "device", label)
httpx.WriteJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]any{
"User": dto,
"AccessToken": token,
"ServerId": h.serverIDFor(r.Context()),
})
}
func (h *Handlers) handleUserMe(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, u auth.User) {
dto, err := h.userDTO(r.Context(), u)
if err != nil {
h.fail(w, "build user", err)
return
}
httpx.WriteJSON(w, http.StatusOK, dto)
}
func (h *Handlers) handleUserByID(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, u auth.User) {
id, _, ok := dto.DecodeID(r.PathValue("userId"))
if !ok || id != u.ID {
// A token may only address its own user. Cross-user reads (which
// Jellyfin permits for admins) are NOT implemented; a mismatched id is
// a 404 so account existence is not disclosed.
httpx.WriteError(w, http.StatusNotFound, "user not found")
return
}
dto, err := h.userDTO(r.Context(), u)
if err != nil {
h.fail(w, "build user", err)
return
}
httpx.WriteJSON(w, http.StatusOK, dto)
}
// userDTO renders the Jellyfin user shape, including the visible library
// folders so a client can scope its views.
func (h *Handlers) userDTO(ctx context.Context, u auth.User) (dto.UserDto, error) {
libs, err := auth.VisibleLibraryIDs(ctx, h.db, u)
if err != nil {
return dto.UserDto{}, err
}
return dto.User(u, h.serverIDFor(ctx), libs), nil
}
// deviceLabel best-effort extracts a human device name from the
// X-Emby-Authorization header so the token list in the UI is recognisable.
func deviceLabel(r *http.Request) string {
hdr := r.Header.Get("X-Emby-Authorization")
if hdr == "" {
hdr = r.Header.Get("Authorization")
}
for _, f := range splitParams(hdr) {
if v, ok := cutParam(f, "Device="); ok && v != "" {
return "Jellyfin: " + v
}
}
return "Jellyfin"
}
// splitParams splits a MediaBrowser-style parameter list on commas or spaces.
func splitParams(s string) []string {
out := []string{}
cur := ""
for _, r := range s {
if r == ',' || r == ' ' {
if cur != "" {
out = append(out, cur)
}
cur = ""
continue
}
cur += string(r)
}
if cur != "" {
out = append(out, cur)
}
return out
}
func cutParam(field, prefix string) (string, bool) {
if len(field) < len(prefix) || field[:len(prefix)] != prefix {
return "", false
}
v := field[len(prefix):]
if len(v) >= 2 && v[0] == '"' && v[len(v)-1] == '"' {
v = v[1 : len(v)-1]
}
return v, true
}