.gitea/workflows/ci.yml

@@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
-name: CI
-
-on:
-  push:
-  pull_request:
-
-jobs:
-  ci:
-    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
-    steps:
-      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
-
-      - uses: actions/setup-go@v5
-        with:
-          go-version: '1.26'
-
-      - name: gofmt
-        run: test -z "$(gofmt -l .)"
-
-      - run: go build ./...
-
-      - run: go vet ./...
-
-      - run: go test ./...
-
-      - uses: actions/setup-node@v4
-        with:
-          node-version: '22'
-
-      - uses: pnpm/action-setup@v4
-        with:
-          version: '12'
-
-      - name: web check
-        working-directory: web
-        run: pnpm install --frozen-lockfile && pnpm check

cmd/vellum/main.go

@@ -88,7 +88,6 @@ func run(cfg core.Config, log *slog.Logger) error {
 	api := httpapi.New(db, log, version)
 
 	authenticator := auth.NewAuthenticator(db, cfg.CookieName, cfg.SessionTTL, cfg.CookieSecure, log)
-	authenticator.TrustedProxies = cfg.TrustedProxies
 	if !cfg.CookieSecure {
 		log.Warn("VELLUM_COOKIE_SECURE is false; session cookies will be sent over plain HTTP. " +
 			"Set it to true when serving over TLS.")

internal/auth/clientip_test.go

@@ -1,118 +0,0 @@
-package auth
-
-import (
-	"net"
-	"net/http"
-	"net/http/httptest"
-	"testing"
-)
-
-// clientIPFor builds an Authenticator trusting the given CIDRs and returns the
-// address it derives from a request arriving from peer with header XFF.
-func clientIPFor(t *testing.T, peer, xff string, trusted ...string) string {
-	t.Helper()
-	a := &Authenticator{}
-	for _, c := range trusted {
-		_, n, err := net.ParseCIDR(c)
-		if err != nil {
-			t.Fatalf("parse test CIDR %q: %v", c, err)
-		}
-		a.TrustedProxies = append(a.TrustedProxies, n)
-	}
-	r := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/", nil)
-	r.RemoteAddr = peer
-	if xff != "" {
-		r.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-For", xff)
-	}
-	return a.ClientIP(r)
-}
-
-func TestClientIPUntrustedPeerIgnoresForwardedFor(t *testing.T) {
-	// The security case: an untrusted peer sending X-Forwarded-For must not be
-	// believed, or anyone could evade (or poison) the login rate limiter.
-	got := clientIPFor(t, "203.0.113.9:44321", "1.2.3.4", "172.16.0.0/12")
-	if got != "203.0.113.9" {
-		t.Errorf("ClientIP = %q, want the peer 203.0.113.9", got)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestClientIPTrustedPeerUsesForwardedFor(t *testing.T) {
-	// The reverse-proxy case: every request arrives from the proxy, so without
-	// the header every client shares one limiter key.
-	got := clientIPFor(t, "172.20.0.5:51000", "1.2.3.4", "172.16.0.0/12")
-	if got != "1.2.3.4" {
-		t.Errorf("ClientIP = %q, want the client 1.2.3.4 from the header", got)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestClientIPChain(t *testing.T) {
-	tests := []struct {
-		name    string
-		peer    string
-		xff     string
-		trusted []string
-		want    string
-	}{
-		{
-			name: "no trusted proxies at all",
-			peer: "172.20.0.5:51000", xff: "1.2.3.4",
-			want: "172.20.0.5",
-		},
-		{
-			name:    "trusted peer without header",
-			peer:    "172.20.0.5:51000",
-			trusted: []string{"172.16.0.0/12"},
-			want:    "172.20.0.5",
-		},
-		{
-			name: "spans proxies on the right of the client",
-			peer: "172.20.0.5:51000", xff: "1.2.3.4, 172.18.0.1",
-			trusted: []string{"172.16.0.0/12"},
-			want:    "1.2.3.4",
-		},
-		{
-			// A client-supplied leftmost entry is attacker-controlled, so the
-			// walk must stop at the first untrusted hop counting from the right.
-			name: "ignores a spoofed leftmost entry",
-			peer: "172.20.0.5:51000", xff: "9.9.9.9, 1.2.3.4, 172.18.0.1",
-			trusted: []string{"172.16.0.0/12"},
-			want:    "1.2.3.4",
-		},
-		{
-			name: "every hop trusted falls back to the leftmost",
-			peer: "172.20.0.5:51000", xff: "172.19.0.1, 172.18.0.1, 172.17.0.1",
-			trusted: []string{"172.16.0.0/12"},
-			want:    "172.19.0.1",
-		},
-		{
-			name: "multiple trusted networks",
-			peer: "127.0.0.1:51000", xff: "1.2.3.4",
-			trusted: []string{"172.16.0.0/12", "127.0.0.1/32"},
-			want:    "1.2.3.4",
-		},
-		{
-			name: "unparseable hop is not trusted",
-			peer: "172.20.0.5:51000", xff: "not-an-ip",
-			trusted: []string{"172.16.0.0/12"},
-			want:    "not-an-ip",
-		},
-		{
-			name: "remote address without a port",
-			peer: "172.20.0.5", xff: "1.2.3.4",
-			trusted: []string{"172.16.0.0/12"},
-			want:    "1.2.3.4",
-		},
-		{
-			name: "untrusted peer without a port",
-			peer: "203.0.113.9", xff: "1.2.3.4",
-			want: "203.0.113.9",
-		},
-	}
-	for _, tc := range tests {
-		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
-			if got := clientIPFor(t, tc.peer, tc.xff, tc.trusted...); got != tc.want {
-				t.Errorf("ClientIP = %q, want %q", got, tc.want)
-			}
-		})
-	}
-}

internal/auth/handlers.go

@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ func (h *Handlers) handleLogin(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		return
 	}
 
-	ip := h.auth.ClientIP(r)
+	ip := ClientIP(r)
 	if !h.limiter.allow(ip + "|" + req.Username) {
 		h.log.Warn("login rate limited", "ip", ip, "username", req.Username)
 		httpx.WriteError(w, http.StatusTooManyRequests, "too many login attempts, try again later")

internal/auth/middleware.go

@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ import (
 	"log/slog"
 	"net"
 	"net/http"
-	"strings"
 	"time"
 
 	"github.com/mithral/vellum/internal/httpx"
@@ -34,9 +33,6 @@ type Authenticator struct {
 	CookieTTL  time.Duration
 	Secure     bool
 	Log        *slog.Logger
-	// TrustedProxies are the networks allowed to name the real client in
-	// X-Forwarded-For. Empty means trust nobody. Set from cfg.TrustedProxies.
-	TrustedProxies []*net.IPNet
 
 	// touchEvery is the minimum age of a session's last_seen before Middleware
 	// will write it again. A zero value means "touch on every request" (the
@@ -186,49 +182,12 @@ func (a *Authenticator) TokenFromRequest(r *http.Request) (string, error) {
 }
 
 // ClientIP extracts a best-effort client address for logging and rate limiting.
-//
-// Behind a reverse proxy every request arrives from the proxy, so RemoteAddr
-// alone keys the login limiter identically for every client on the internet:
-// one attacker locks out a username for everyone, and sessions.ip records the
-// proxy. X-Forwarded-For fixes that, but only for a peer we already trust —
-// from an untrusted peer that header is attacker-controlled, so it is ignored
-// outright and the connection's own address is used, as before.
-//
-// With a trusted peer the chain is walked right-to-left and the first address
-// that is not itself a trusted proxy wins: everything to its right is a hop we
-// control, and everything to its left was appended by a client we do not. If
-// every hop is trusted the leftmost entry is the best available answer.
-func (a *Authenticator) ClientIP(r *http.Request) string {
+// It deliberately does NOT trust X-Forwarded-For: behind an untrusted network
+// that header is attacker-controlled, and this server is LAN-facing.
+func ClientIP(r *http.Request) string {
 	host, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(r.RemoteAddr)
 	if err != nil {
-		host = r.RemoteAddr
+		return r.RemoteAddr
 	}
-	if !a.trusts(host) {
-		return host
-	}
-	chain := r.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-For")
-	if chain == "" {
-		return host
-	}
-	hops := strings.Split(chain, ",")
-	for i := len(hops) - 1; i >= 0; i-- {
-		if hop := strings.TrimSpace(hops[i]); !a.trusts(hop) {
-			return hop
-		}
-	}
-	return strings.TrimSpace(hops[0])
-}
-
-// trusts reports whether ip falls inside one of the configured proxy networks.
-func (a *Authenticator) trusts(ip string) bool {
-	parsed := net.ParseIP(ip)
-	if parsed == nil {
-		return false
-	}
-	for _, n := range a.TrustedProxies {
-		if n.Contains(parsed) {
-			return true
-		}
-	}
-	return false
+	return host
 }

internal/core/config.go

@@ -2,7 +2,6 @@ package core
 
 import (
 	"fmt"
-	"net"
 	"os"
 	"path/filepath"
 	"strconv"
@@ -45,15 +44,6 @@ type Config struct {
 	CookieName   string
 	CookieSecure bool
 
-	// PublicURL is the external origin Vellum is reached at, e.g.
-	// "https://media.example.com". Empty means "not published", which is the
-	// case for plain-HTTP LAN use. It is the signal that the deployment sits
-	// behind a TLS-terminating proxy, so it also drives the CookieSecure default.
-	PublicURL string
-	// TrustedProxies are the networks allowed to speak for a client in
-	// X-Forwarded-For. Empty means trust nobody: only RemoteAddr is used.
-	TrustedProxies []*net.IPNet
-
 	SessionTTL    time.Duration
 	ReadTimeout   time.Duration
 	WriteTimeout  time.Duration
@@ -64,7 +54,6 @@ type Config struct {
 // LoadConfig reads configuration from the environment and fills in defaults.
 // It does not create directories; call Validate for that.
 func LoadConfig() (Config, error) {
-	publicURL := env("VELLUM_PUBLIC_URL", "")
 	c := Config{
 		Listen:        env("VELLUM_LISTEN", ":7788"),
 		DataDir:       env("VELLUM_DATA_DIR", "./data"),
@@ -80,11 +69,10 @@ func LoadConfig() (Config, error) {
 		IGDBClientID:     env("VELLUM_IGDB_CLIENT_ID", ""),
 		IGDBClientSecret: env("VELLUM_IGDB_CLIENT_SECRET", ""),
 		CookieName:       env("VELLUM_COOKIE_NAME", "vellum_session"),
-		// Secure defaults to true for an https:// PublicURL — a published origin
-		// is TLS-terminated, so plain-HTTP dev still gets false with it unset.
-		// VELLUM_COOKIE_SECURE overrides both ways; boot logs a warning when off.
-		CookieSecure:  envBool("VELLUM_COOKIE_SECURE", strings.HasPrefix(publicURL, "https://")),
-		PublicURL:     publicURL,
+		// Secure defaults to false so plain-HTTP development works. Production
+		// behind TLS must set VELLUM_COOKIE_SECURE=true; boot logs a warning
+		// when it is off.
+		CookieSecure:  envBool("VELLUM_COOKIE_SECURE", false),
 		SessionTTL:    envDuration("VELLUM_SESSION_TTL", 30*24*time.Hour),
 		ReadTimeout:   envDuration("VELLUM_READ_TIMEOUT", 15*time.Second),
 		WriteTimeout:  envDuration("VELLUM_WRITE_TIMEOUT", 0), // 0 = no limit; streaming needs this
@@ -92,12 +80,6 @@ func LoadConfig() (Config, error) {
 		ShutdownGrace: envDuration("VELLUM_SHUTDOWN_GRACE", 15*time.Second),
 	}
 
-	proxies, err := envCIDRs("VELLUM_TRUSTED_PROXIES")
-	if err != nil {
-		return Config{}, err
-	}
-	c.TrustedProxies = proxies
-
 	abs, err := filepath.Abs(c.DataDir)
 	if err != nil {
 		return Config{}, fmt.Errorf("resolve data dir: %w", err)
@@ -167,25 +149,6 @@ func envList(key string, def []string) []string {
 	return out
 }
 
-// envCIDRs parses a comma-separated CIDR list, e.g.
-// "172.16.0.0/12,127.0.0.1/32". A malformed entry is an error rather than a
-// silent skip: dropping a proxy network quietly widens the trust boundary,
-// which is exactly the failure this setting exists to prevent.
-func envCIDRs(key string) ([]*net.IPNet, error) {
-	var out []*net.IPNet
-	for _, part := range strings.Split(env(key, ""), ",") {
-		if part = strings.TrimSpace(part); part == "" {
-			continue
-		}
-		_, n, err := net.ParseCIDR(part)
-		if err != nil {
-			return nil, fmt.Errorf("%s: %w", key, err)
-		}
-		out = append(out, n)
-	}
-	return out, nil
-}
-
 func envDuration(key string, def time.Duration) time.Duration {
 	v, ok := os.LookupEnv(key)
 	if !ok || v == "" {

internal/core/config_test.go

@@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
 package core
 
 import (
-	"net"
 	"path/filepath"
 	"strings"
 	"testing"
@@ -51,72 +50,6 @@ func TestLoadConfigFromEnv(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
-func TestLoadConfigTrustedProxies(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Setenv("VELLUM_TRUSTED_PROXIES", "172.16.0.0/12, 127.0.0.1/32")
-
-	cfg, err := LoadConfig()
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("LoadConfig: %v", err)
-	}
-	if len(cfg.TrustedProxies) != 2 {
-		t.Fatalf("TrustedProxies = %v, want 2 entries", cfg.TrustedProxies)
-	}
-	if !cfg.TrustedProxies[0].Contains(net.ParseIP("172.20.0.5")) {
-		t.Errorf("TrustedProxies[0] = %v, want it to contain 172.20.0.5", cfg.TrustedProxies[0])
-	}
-	if cfg.TrustedProxies[1].Contains(net.ParseIP("172.20.0.5")) {
-		t.Errorf("TrustedProxies[1] = %v, want it to contain only 127.0.0.1", cfg.TrustedProxies[1])
-	}
-}
-
-func TestLoadConfigRejectsBadTrustedProxy(t *testing.T) {
-	// A malformed entry must fail the boot: silently dropping it would quietly
-	// narrow the trust boundary and the operator would never know.
-	t.Setenv("VELLUM_TRUSTED_PROXIES", "172.16.0.0/12, not-a-cidr")
-
-	_, err := LoadConfig()
-	if err == nil {
-		t.Fatal("expected error for malformed VELLUM_TRUSTED_PROXIES")
-	}
-	if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "not-a-cidr") {
-		t.Errorf("error %q should name the offending entry", err)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestCookieSecureDefaultsFromPublicURL(t *testing.T) {
-	tests := []struct {
-		name   string
-		public string
-		cookie string // empty means unset
-		want   bool
-	}{
-		{name: "https origin secures the cookie", public: "https://media.example.com", want: true},
-		{name: "http origin leaves it off", public: "http://media.example.com", want: false},
-		{name: "unset origin leaves it off", want: false},
-		{name: "explicit false overrides https", public: "https://media.example.com", cookie: "false", want: false},
-		{name: "explicit true overrides http", public: "http://media.example.com", cookie: "true", want: true},
-	}
-	for _, tc := range tests {
-		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
-			t.Setenv("VELLUM_PUBLIC_URL", tc.public)
-			// An empty value reads as unset to the env helpers, and t.Setenv
-			// restores the ambient value either way.
-			t.Setenv("VELLUM_COOKIE_SECURE", tc.cookie)
-
-			cfg, err := LoadConfig()
-			if err != nil {
-				t.Fatalf("LoadConfig: %v", err)
-			}
-			if cfg.PublicURL != tc.public {
-				t.Errorf("PublicURL = %q, want %q", cfg.PublicURL, tc.public)
-			}
-			if cfg.CookieSecure != tc.want {
-				t.Errorf("CookieSecure = %v, want %v", cfg.CookieSecure, tc.want)
-			}
-		})
-	}
-}
-
 func TestValidateRejectsMissingMediaDir(t *testing.T) {
 	cfg := Config{
 		DataDir:   t.TempDir(),

internal/core/migrate.go

@@ -31,23 +31,6 @@ func Migrate(ctx context.Context, db *sql.DB, fsys fs.FS, log *slog.Logger) erro
 	}
 	log.Debug("schema version", "current", current, "available", len(names))
 
-	highest := 0
-	for _, name := range names {
-		n, err := migrationNumber(name)
-		if err != nil {
-			return err
-		}
-		if n > highest {
-			highest = n
-		}
-	}
-	// A version above every embedded migration means this binary is older than
-	// the database. Without this, the loop below skips everything and starts up
-	// against a schema it cannot read.
-	if current > highest {
-		return fmt.Errorf("database schema is version %d but this binary only knows %d: this binary is older than the database — upgrade the binary or restore a backup", current, highest)
-	}
-
 	for _, name := range names {
 		n, err := migrationNumber(name)
 		if err != nil {

internal/core/migrate_test.go

@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ package core
 import (
 	"context"
 	"database/sql"
-	"fmt"
 	"io"
 	"io/fs"
 	"log/slog"
@@ -105,25 +104,6 @@ func TestForeignKeyEnforcementIsOn(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
-func TestMigrateRefusesDatabaseNewerThanBinary(t *testing.T) {
-	ctx := context.Background()
-	db := openTempDB(t)
-
-	// A database migrated by a newer binary.
-	newer := highestMigrationNumber(t) + 1
-	if _, err := db.ExecContext(ctx, fmt.Sprintf("PRAGMA user_version = %d", newer)); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("set user_version: %v", err)
-	}
-
-	err := Migrate(ctx, db, migrations.FS, discardLogger())
-	if err == nil {
-		t.Fatal("expected error when user_version is above the highest embedded migration, got nil")
-	}
-	if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), fmt.Sprintf("version %d", newer)) {
-		t.Errorf("error should name the database version, got: %v", err)
-	}
-}
-
 func TestMigrationNumber(t *testing.T) {
 	cases := map[string]int{
 		"0001_core.sql":       1,