Commit graph

5 commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
mithral
df740d3e1a Phase 5: job queue and metadata providers
- jobs: a table-backed queue in the same SQLite file. No Redis, no second
  process, included in the same backup. claim() is a single UPDATE...RETURNING
  so a job cannot run twice even with several workers. Failures back off
  exponentially; a missing handler fails permanently rather than retrying a
  bug.
- metadata: Provider interface plus Open Library and Google Books (both
  keyless). The enricher tries providers in registration order, falls back on
  empty, and continues past a provider error.
- migration 0004: metadata_fetch records the attempt, not just the match, so a
  rescan does not re-hammer a rate-limited API for an item that will never
  match. Errors are always retried; ok/notfound are cached for 30 days.
- enrichment writes provider_ids, updates title/year, links authors through
  people/item_people, and downloads the cover as an asset. The cover download
  runs outside the transaction: a slow image host must not hold a write lock.
- endpoints: queue enrichment per library, and inspect an item's matches.
- web: Enrich button per library.

Verified live against Open Library: "The Hobbit" matched /works/OL27482W,
title and year 1937 written, a 301x500 JPEG cover downloaded and served.
2026-10-09 21:16:07 -04:00
mithral
a2c2f7a7c1 Phase 2b: FTS5 search
- migration 0003: an FTS5 index over media_items as an external-content table,
  so the index stores no copy of the text. Triggers keep it in sync for every
  write path, including the scanner's bulk inserts.
- migrate: splitStatements now tracks BEGIN...END depth, so CREATE TRIGGER
  bodies survive as one statement. Without this, the trigger's internal
  semicolons would tear it apart.
- search: every whitespace term is quoted before it reaches FTS5. Unquoted
  input like a bare quote, a hyphen, or the word OR is valid FTS5 syntax and
  would either error or silently change the query's meaning. Tested against a
  list of hostile inputs, including a DROP TABLE attempt.
- scoped through the same VisibleLibraryIDs chokepoint; an empty library set
  returns nothing, never everything.
- web: search box in the topbar and a results view.

Verified live: finds items across libraries, hostile input returns 200 with no
results, index stays in sync on insert/update/delete.
2026-10-09 21:10:44 -04:00
mithral
5458b0a28a Phase 2: libraries and the file scanner
- library: CRUD with root-path resolution (absolute, symlink-free, must be
  readable). A library name is unique; the root is validated at creation.
- registry: media types declare their extensions; the core never imports a
  module. RegisterType is the extension point.
- scanner: walks a root, reconciles media_items/media_files in one
  transaction, skips unchanged files by size+mtime, and marks vanished files
  missing rather than deleting them (progress is the one thing here that
  cannot be regenerated). A single unreadable file never fails a scan.
- migration 0002: `missing` flags on items and files, plus indexes.
- endpoints: media-types, library list/get/create/delete, per-library items,
  and scan. Library reads go through the same grant chokepoint as everything
  else; an unauthorised library 404s rather than 403s so its existence is not
  leaked.
2026-10-09 16:33:56 -04:00
mithral
9772e55c73 Phase 1: accounts, sessions, per-library grants
Multi-user from the first migration, as planned.

- auth: argon2id password hashing (PHC encoded, parameters travel with the
  hash), opaque session tokens stored only as SHA-256, login rate limiting,
  and account enumeration resistance (unknown user hashes anyway)
- sessions: cookie or Bearer auth, HttpOnly + SameSite=Lax, revocation on
  password change
- grants: library_grants is the single access-control chokepoint. Admins see
  every library; everyone else sees exactly their can_read grants
- bootstrap: VELLUM_ADMIN_USER/PASSWORD create the first admin only on an
  empty database. No default password is ever invented.
- httpapi: mounts modules on a shared mux, session middleware innermost
- httpx: shared JSON helpers, strict body decoding

Gate: two users see different libraries. Tests cover that, plus session
expiry, token-at-rest, grant upsert, and the full login/me/logout flow.
2026-10-09 16:31:24 -04:00
mithral
eb1ad6d920 Phase 0: skeleton, config, migrations, health check, container
Bootstraps Vellum as a single Go binary with one SQLite database.

- core: env-driven config, slog logging, SQLite (WAL) with pooled pragmas,
  embedded migration runner keyed on PRAGMA user_version
- migrations/0001_core.sql: identity, media, user state, infra. Media items
  are global; all per-user state (progress, favorites, grants) is a join.
  One polymorphic progress table covers every media kind.
- httpapi: request-ID, structured request logging, panic recovery, JSON
  endpoints for /healthz and /api/v1/version
- multi-arch Dockerfile (pure-Go SQLite, CGO_ENABLED=0) with an entrypoint
  that honours PUID/PGID like the rest of the self-hosted stack
- tests for migration idempotency, FK enforcement, WAL, config, middleware

Media does not exist yet. Nothing is exposed beyond health and version.
2026-10-09 16:26:08 -04:00