- migration 0003: an FTS5 index over media_items as an external-content table,
so the index stores no copy of the text. Triggers keep it in sync for every
write path, including the scanner's bulk inserts.
- migrate: splitStatements now tracks BEGIN...END depth, so CREATE TRIGGER
bodies survive as one statement. Without this, the trigger's internal
semicolons would tear it apart.
- search: every whitespace term is quoted before it reaches FTS5. Unquoted
input like a bare quote, a hyphen, or the word OR is valid FTS5 syntax and
would either error or silently change the query's meaning. Tested against a
list of hostile inputs, including a DROP TABLE attempt.
- scoped through the same VisibleLibraryIDs chokepoint; an empty library set
returns nothing, never everything.
- web: search box in the topbar and a results view.
Verified live: finds items across libraries, hostile input returns 200 with no
results, index stays in sync on insert/update/delete.
- library: CRUD with root-path resolution (absolute, symlink-free, must be
readable). A library name is unique; the root is validated at creation.
- registry: media types declare their extensions; the core never imports a
module. RegisterType is the extension point.
- scanner: walks a root, reconciles media_items/media_files in one
transaction, skips unchanged files by size+mtime, and marks vanished files
missing rather than deleting them (progress is the one thing here that
cannot be regenerated). A single unreadable file never fails a scan.
- migration 0002: `missing` flags on items and files, plus indexes.
- endpoints: media-types, library list/get/create/delete, per-library items,
and scan. Library reads go through the same grant chokepoint as everything
else; an unauthorised library 404s rather than 403s so its existence is not
leaked.
Multi-user from the first migration, as planned.
- auth: argon2id password hashing (PHC encoded, parameters travel with the
hash), opaque session tokens stored only as SHA-256, login rate limiting,
and account enumeration resistance (unknown user hashes anyway)
- sessions: cookie or Bearer auth, HttpOnly + SameSite=Lax, revocation on
password change
- grants: library_grants is the single access-control chokepoint. Admins see
every library; everyone else sees exactly their can_read grants
- bootstrap: VELLUM_ADMIN_USER/PASSWORD create the first admin only on an
empty database. No default password is ever invented.
- httpapi: mounts modules on a shared mux, session middleware innermost
- httpx: shared JSON helpers, strict body decoding
Gate: two users see different libraries. Tests cover that, plus session
expiry, token-at-rest, grant upsert, and the full login/me/logout flow.
Bootstraps Vellum as a single Go binary with one SQLite database.
- core: env-driven config, slog logging, SQLite (WAL) with pooled pragmas,
embedded migration runner keyed on PRAGMA user_version
- migrations/0001_core.sql: identity, media, user state, infra. Media items
are global; all per-user state (progress, favorites, grants) is a join.
One polymorphic progress table covers every media kind.
- httpapi: request-ID, structured request logging, panic recovery, JSON
endpoints for /healthz and /api/v1/version
- multi-arch Dockerfile (pure-Go SQLite, CGO_ENABLED=0) with an entrypoint
that honours PUID/PGID like the rest of the self-hosted stack
- tests for migration idempotency, FK enforcement, WAL, config, middleware
Media does not exist yet. Nothing is exposed beyond health and version.
