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11 commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
mithral
87c17d4854 Make the login limiter correct behind a reverse proxy
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ClientIP used r.RemoteAddr and ignored X-Forwarded-For. That was right
about not trusting the header from an untrusted peer, but it is only half
the design: behind a proxy every request arrives from the proxy, so the
limiter key in handlers.go was "<proxy-ip>|<username>" for every client on
the internet. One attacker locked out a username for everyone, an attacker
rotating usernames never hit a limit, and sessions.ip recorded the proxy
so the device list was useless.

- VELLUM_TRUSTED_PROXIES is a CIDR list. X-Forwarded-For is honoured only
  when RemoteAddr is inside it, and the chain is walked right-to-left so
  the first address that is not itself a trusted proxy wins. Everything to
  its left was appended by a client we do not control, so a spoofed
  leftmost entry is discarded.
- VELLUM_PUBLIC_URL is the external origin. CookieSecure now defaults to
  true when it is https://, so a TLS deployment that forgets
  VELLUM_COOKIE_SECURE no longer ships a plaintext session cookie.
- A malformed CIDR fails the boot rather than being skipped: silently
  dropping a proxy network widens the trust boundary, which is the exact
  failure this setting exists to prevent.

ClientIP became a method on Authenticator so it can see the trusted set,
which is why handlers.go and main.go changed as well.

Verified red-green: neutering the trusted-peer path fails five ClientIP
tests, including the spoofed-leftmost case.

Known gap, pre-existing and not fixed here: this limiter still covers only
/api/v1/auth/login. Jellyfin AuthenticateByName and Subsonic auth call
auth.Authenticate with no limiting, so the same brute force is available
through those two surfaces.
2026-10-12 00:45:27 -04:00
mithral
35e81400f2 Refuse to start when the database is newer than the binary
Migrate only skipped migrations whose number was already applied (n <=
current). Point an older binary at a database a newer binary had already
migrated and it started happily, then read columns that had moved. For a
self-hosted app that is the worst failure mode: silent schema confusion
rather than a clean refusal.

Migrate now errors when PRAGMA user_version exceeds the highest embedded
migration, naming both numbers. Both callers already propagate the error,
so the binary exits at startup instead.

Verified red-green: removing the guard fails
TestMigrateRefusesDatabaseNewerThanBinary.
2026-10-12 00:45:27 -04:00
mithral
051169a18a Documentation, and make a fresh clone actually work
Docs
- docs/ARCHITECTURE.md: how the pieces fit and why. The request path, the six
  enforced layers, the data model, the scanner, the job queue, direct-play
  playback, and the three protocol surfaces over one application.
- docs/decisions/: seven ADRs with the alternatives that were rejected —
  SQLite-with-a-seam, direct-play-only, mark-missing-never-delete, the modular
  monolith, the one item-access chokepoint, the table-backed queue, and
  fixed-width timestamps.
- README: the layout section was stale (it predated catalog, home, scanner,
  providers, engine, probe, playback, apitoken, arch and the dto packages) and
  now lists what exists, plus links to the new docs.

Two real bugs, both found by verifying the docs instead of trusting them

1. The CLI could not run on a fresh install. `Config.Validate` created the data
   and config directories, but the CLI never called it, so `vellum user add` —
   the recovery path when you are locked out — failed with "unable to open
   database file" until the server had booted at least once. Split the directory
   creation into `Config.EnsureDirs`, call it from the CLI, and keep the media
   root check out of it: an admin command must not fail because a library is
   unmounted. The CLI tests now point DBPath inside DataDir, exactly as
   LoadConfig derives it, so they exercise the fresh-install path; removing
   EnsureDirs fails three of them.

2. A fresh clone could not build at all. `//go:embed all:dist` fails to compile
   when web/dist is absent, and web/.gitignore expected a `dist/.gitkeep` that
   was never created. Added it, so a clone builds and the server logs
   "web UI not embedded; run the frontend build to include it" — the intended
   behaviour for someone who only wants the API.

Also: the httpapi tests depended on a built frontend and FAILED rather than
skipping, so the suite was red on any fresh clone. findAsset and readAsset now
skip with a message naming the missing step. They still RUN when a bundle is
present (verified: zero skips here), so they have not been quietly disabled.

Verified from a simulated clone of tracked files only: go build exit 0, 25
packages pass, the server boots and applies all 12 migrations, and the CLI
creates a user and takes a backup. gofmt clean, vet exit 0, svelte-check 0/0.
2026-10-12 00:18:11 -04:00
mithral
c50b3cfb3b Wave 1: survive a real library
A 50k-file library used to wedge the database. This wave fixes the four
reasons why, plus a timestamp-ordering bug the work exposed.

Chunked scans (internal/library/scan.go)
- One transaction wrapped the whole reconciliation, holding SQLite's single
  write lock for the entire scan. Now 500 groups per transaction, and the two
  missing-file passes are batched too.
- Verified: a 20,000-file scan reports partial progress (scanned=1500 mid-scan)
  and a concurrent progress save returns 200 throughout. Under the old code
  that save blocked for the whole scan.
- Behaviour change: a scan is no longer all-or-nothing. A crash now leaves a
  consistent partial scan. The scan is idempotent, so re-running finishes it.
- res.Errors is capped at 100 (a broken mount used to append one string per
  file, then serialise the lot into the job row); the overflow is counted.

Concurrent job workers (internal/jobs/jobs.go)
- Run() was single-threaded, so a scan stalled every enrichment job behind it.
  Now 4 workers with jittered idle waits.
- Handlers run concurrently, so Register/lookup take an RWMutex, and a
  panicking handler is recovered and marked failed rather than killing a worker
  and stranding a row in 'running'.
- RecoverStale() requeues jobs left 'running' by a dead process; called at boot
  from main.go. Previously such a job stayed 'running' forever and the UI
  polled it forever.

Explore (internal/media/discover.go)
- Full-scanned and sorted the whole library on every home load, and was
  deterministic, so it showed the same 30 items every visit. Now a per-kind
  fair-share id range scan with a random start, wrap-around, dedup and
  interleaving. The doc comment claimed per-kind sampling before; now it does.

Indexes (migrations/0008_query_indexes.sql)
- Benchmarked with ANALYZE over 60k items: browse page 1 13.37ms -> 0.03ms
  (484x, full scan -> covering index), deep page 8x, recently added 3.2x.
- A candidate index for the Continue shelf was built, measured and REJECTED:
  the planner never chose it because `finished = 0` selects the majority of a
  user's rows, so it had no selectivity and would have cost a write on every
  progress save. Recorded in the migration rather than shipped as dead weight.

Canonical timestamps (internal/core/stamp.go)
- time.RFC3339Nano trims trailing zeros, so its fraction width varies and the
  strings are not lexicographically sortable: ".5Z" > ".55Z" as strings though
  .500s < .550s. That broke every ORDER BY <timestamp> and MAX(timestamp),
  including the Continue shelf and Most Viewed. It was wrong even in columns
  written 100% by Go, so it was not a cross-format issue.
- All 14 write sites now use core.Stamp, matching SQLite's own default format
  exactly. Read paths are untouched: RFC3339Nano parses both shapes, so
  existing rows keep working.

Also: busy_timeout 5s -> 15s. Chunked scans still delay a concurrent write, and
measured tail latency on a first scan of 15k new files reached 3.3s, leaving
almost no margin at 5s. Waiting beats failing with SQLITE_BUSY and losing a
playback position. A 10ms inter-batch yield was implemented, measured, found to
have no effect distinguishable from noise (overlapping ranges), and removed.

Verified end to end, not just compiled: orphan recovery logged at boot, scan
returns 202 in 0.7ms, Explore varies across loads, concurrent writes survive a
scan. gofmt/vet clean, 14 packages pass, -race clean on the queue, svelte-check
0/0, fresh install applies all 8 migrations.
2026-10-11 13:10:34 -04:00
mithral
b82090ed29 Phase 7: games — ROM scanning, platforms, cloud saves, EmulatorJS
The RomM replacement.

- registry: a games media type with ~35 ROM extensions across NES, SNES, GB/GBA,
  N64, NDS, Genesis/Master System/Game Gear, PC Engine, Neo Geo Pocket,
  WonderSwan, Atari, Coleco, Intellivision, and PlayStation.
- games: platform detection from the file extension, mapping each to an
  EmulatorJS core. Platforms with no browser core are recognised but marked
  not-playable so the UI offers a download instead of a broken player.
- migration 0005: game_saves keyed by (user, item, slot). Save states are user
  data, not media — two people playing the same ROM keep their own progress.
- save endpoints with a 16 MiB cap and a validated slot name; the upload is
  read through a LimitReader so an unbounded body is refused rather than
  buffered.
- igdb provider: Twitch client-credentials flow with the token cached for its
  ~2 month lifetime, Apicalypse query body, and cover URLs normalised from
  protocol-relative t_thumb to https t_cover_big.
- searchTitle: strips "(USA)", "[!]", "(Rev 1)" and similar release tags before
  searching. "Sonic the Hedgehog (USA)" matched nothing; "Sonic the Hedgehog"
  matches immediately. Stored titles keep the original.
- web: GamePlayer embeds EmulatorJS and adds Load/Save-to-server buttons.

Verified live against IGDB: Sonic matched (id 316900) with real cover art; a
4 KB save uploaded, listed, downloaded byte-identical, and deleted.
2026-10-09 21:54:49 -04:00
mithral
5a2c3fa090 Comic metadata via ComicVine
- comicvine provider for comics. ComicVine has no keyless tier, so the
  provider is only registered when VELLUM_COMICVINE_API_KEY is set; without it
  the server logs a note and comic enrichment completes as a no-op rather than
  erroring.
- BaseURL is injectable so the response parsing is covered by a test against a
  local server: candidate mapping, the required User-Agent, and the
  status_code=100 invalid-key case (ComicVine returns HTTP 200 for that).
- descriptions are stripped of ComicVine's embedded HTML before storage.

Verified against a fake ComicVine server, and live that a comics library
enriches cleanly with no key configured.
2026-10-09 21:47:51 -04:00
mithral
df740d3e1a Phase 5: job queue and metadata providers
- jobs: a table-backed queue in the same SQLite file. No Redis, no second
  process, included in the same backup. claim() is a single UPDATE...RETURNING
  so a job cannot run twice even with several workers. Failures back off
  exponentially; a missing handler fails permanently rather than retrying a
  bug.
- metadata: Provider interface plus Open Library and Google Books (both
  keyless). The enricher tries providers in registration order, falls back on
  empty, and continues past a provider error.
- migration 0004: metadata_fetch records the attempt, not just the match, so a
  rescan does not re-hammer a rate-limited API for an item that will never
  match. Errors are always retried; ok/notfound are cached for 30 days.
- enrichment writes provider_ids, updates title/year, links authors through
  people/item_people, and downloads the cover as an asset. The cover download
  runs outside the transaction: a slow image host must not hold a write lock.
- endpoints: queue enrichment per library, and inspect an item's matches.
- web: Enrich button per library.

Verified live against Open Library: "The Hobbit" matched /works/OL27482W,
title and year 1937 written, a 301x500 JPEG cover downloaded and served.
2026-10-09 21:16:07 -04:00
mithral
a2c2f7a7c1 Phase 2b: FTS5 search
- migration 0003: an FTS5 index over media_items as an external-content table,
  so the index stores no copy of the text. Triggers keep it in sync for every
  write path, including the scanner's bulk inserts.
- migrate: splitStatements now tracks BEGIN...END depth, so CREATE TRIGGER
  bodies survive as one statement. Without this, the trigger's internal
  semicolons would tear it apart.
- search: every whitespace term is quoted before it reaches FTS5. Unquoted
  input like a bare quote, a hyphen, or the word OR is valid FTS5 syntax and
  would either error or silently change the query's meaning. Tested against a
  list of hostile inputs, including a DROP TABLE attempt.
- scoped through the same VisibleLibraryIDs chokepoint; an empty library set
  returns nothing, never everything.
- web: search box in the topbar and a results view.

Verified live: finds items across libraries, hostile input returns 200 with no
results, index stays in sync on insert/update/delete.
2026-10-09 21:10:44 -04:00
mithral
5458b0a28a Phase 2: libraries and the file scanner
- library: CRUD with root-path resolution (absolute, symlink-free, must be
  readable). A library name is unique; the root is validated at creation.
- registry: media types declare their extensions; the core never imports a
  module. RegisterType is the extension point.
- scanner: walks a root, reconciles media_items/media_files in one
  transaction, skips unchanged files by size+mtime, and marks vanished files
  missing rather than deleting them (progress is the one thing here that
  cannot be regenerated). A single unreadable file never fails a scan.
- migration 0002: `missing` flags on items and files, plus indexes.
- endpoints: media-types, library list/get/create/delete, per-library items,
  and scan. Library reads go through the same grant chokepoint as everything
  else; an unauthorised library 404s rather than 403s so its existence is not
  leaked.
2026-10-09 16:33:56 -04:00
mithral
9772e55c73 Phase 1: accounts, sessions, per-library grants
Multi-user from the first migration, as planned.

- auth: argon2id password hashing (PHC encoded, parameters travel with the
  hash), opaque session tokens stored only as SHA-256, login rate limiting,
  and account enumeration resistance (unknown user hashes anyway)
- sessions: cookie or Bearer auth, HttpOnly + SameSite=Lax, revocation on
  password change
- grants: library_grants is the single access-control chokepoint. Admins see
  every library; everyone else sees exactly their can_read grants
- bootstrap: VELLUM_ADMIN_USER/PASSWORD create the first admin only on an
  empty database. No default password is ever invented.
- httpapi: mounts modules on a shared mux, session middleware innermost
- httpx: shared JSON helpers, strict body decoding

Gate: two users see different libraries. Tests cover that, plus session
expiry, token-at-rest, grant upsert, and the full login/me/logout flow.
2026-10-09 16:31:24 -04:00
mithral
eb1ad6d920 Phase 0: skeleton, config, migrations, health check, container
Bootstraps Vellum as a single Go binary with one SQLite database.

- core: env-driven config, slog logging, SQLite (WAL) with pooled pragmas,
  embedded migration runner keyed on PRAGMA user_version
- migrations/0001_core.sql: identity, media, user state, infra. Media items
  are global; all per-user state (progress, favorites, grants) is a join.
  One polymorphic progress table covers every media kind.
- httpapi: request-ID, structured request logging, panic recovery, JSON
  endpoints for /healthz and /api/v1/version
- multi-arch Dockerfile (pure-Go SQLite, CGO_ENABLED=0) with an entrypoint
  that honours PUID/PGID like the rest of the self-hosted stack
- tests for migration idempotency, FK enforcement, WAL, config, middleware

Media does not exist yet. Nothing is exposed beyond health and version.
2026-10-09 16:26:08 -04:00