Five providers existed and none covered the "video" kind, so every movie
and show got a title from its filename and nothing else - no poster, no
plot, no cast, no year. That is the gap between "a folder of videos with a
nice web UI" and a media server.
TMDB keeps films and television in separate namespaces behind separate
endpoints, and a Query does not say which one it is. Rather than guessing
from the title, Search asks both at once and merges by TMDB popularity,
which is the only ranking signal available without a second request per
item.
Speed is the point, so the two requests run concurrently over one derived
context on a single shared client, and whichever fails first cancels the
other: one dead endpoint cannot hold the result hostage while the healthy
one is waited out. Verified red-green - serialising the two fetches makes
TestTMDBSearchesConcurrently fail at 2s.
Two corrections made in review, both found by reading the code rather than
trusting the report:
1. ExternalID was the bare TMDB id, so film 603 and show 603 - different
works - would have been stored identically in provider_ids. Namespaced
as movie/603 and tv/603. Nothing resolves an item from an external_id
today, so this was latent rather than broken, but the table is populated
as enrichment runs and correcting it later would have needed a data
migration. Pinned by TestTMDBExternalIDIsNamespaced.
2. Query.Year was added but never populated, so the year filter - the main
way to tell a remake from the original - never applied. catalog.Item
already carried Year; the enricher now passes it.
No cover bytes are fetched here: the provider returns image URLs and the
existing enricher caches what it uses. A missing key logs the env var and
skips, so the feature is discoverable from the boot log.
Not verified: the live TMDB API. Tests run against httptest servers only.
internal/discovery registers three service types on the listen port:
_vellum._tcp for native clients, and _jellyfin._tcp / _subsonic._tcp
because those ecosystems already have clients that browse the LAN. That
last part is the point: Infuse, Jellyfin Media Player and Symfonium can
find Vellum with no client-side work, because they are already looking for
those names.
TXT records carry api, ver, proto, types, tls and (when set) pub, so a
client that resolves one can tell what it found before connecting.
Definitions is a pure function of config and Start only registers what it
returns, so what is advertised is testable without a socket.
Two behaviours worth knowing:
- VELLUM_DISCOVERY=off stops advertising. It accepts off/no/false/0;
strconv.ParseBool would have silently ignored "off".
- A loopback-only listen address advertises nothing. That is the normal
shape behind a reverse proxy, and advertising it would put a port in the
LAN browse list that refuses every client that dials it. Verified
red-green: defeating the guard fails TestDefinitionsSkipsLoopbackListen.
zeroconf is the only new dependency. It logs to the stdlib logger, so a
host with no multicast-capable interface prints to stderr outside slog.
Not verified: real mDNS on a real LAN. There is no multicast here, so the
wire behaviour of zeroconf is untested - only the definitions it is handed.
Many Jellyfin clients probe GET /emby/System/Info/Public during their
handshake. There was no /emby prefix anywhere in the tree, so that 404ed
and the client abandoned discovery and fell back to its manual "enter your
server URL" screen - the exact experience mDNS exists to remove.
Register installs every pattern twice through a mount helper, with the same
handler value both times, so the alias cannot drift from the root surface.
The JSON 404 fallbacks get /emby forms too, plus one subtree handler,
because static.go's isAPIPath knows only /healthz and /api/ and an unknown
/emby/... path would otherwise be served the SPA shell.
No new endpoint, no handler behaviour changed, and the bare root paths are
untouched: Jellyfin's own clients use them.
The limiter covered only /api/v1/auth/login. Jellyfin's AuthenticateByName
and Subsonic's authenticate both called auth.Authenticate with no limiting,
so an attacker brute-forced through those instead: the same password, the
same argon2, no ceiling.
The limiter moves from auth.Handlers onto *Authenticator, which all three
surfaces already hold, so they share one budget and splitting guesses
across surfaces gains nothing. main.go builds one authenticator and hands
it to both compat layers, so the sharing is real rather than intended.
Subsonic needs care: it has no login step, authenticate runs on every
request, so a naive check would charge playback against the login budget
and lock a listener out mid-album. The limiter is consulted only when a
credential was actually supplied, and a success or an uncredentialed
request spends nothing.
Verified red-green on all three: removing the Jellyfin gate fails
TestAuthenticateByNameIsRateLimited with 401 instead of 429; removing the
Subsonic credential guard fails
TestSuccessAndUncredentialedDoNotConsumeTheBudget; neutering AllowLogin or
ResetLogin fails the auth tests.
Known gap, unchanged: the limiter is in-process, so it resets on restart
and does not span replicas. Fine for one binary against one SQLite file.
ClientIP used r.RemoteAddr and ignored X-Forwarded-For. That was right
about not trusting the header from an untrusted peer, but it is only half
the design: behind a proxy every request arrives from the proxy, so the
limiter key in handlers.go was "<proxy-ip>|<username>" for every client on
the internet. One attacker locked out a username for everyone, an attacker
rotating usernames never hit a limit, and sessions.ip recorded the proxy
so the device list was useless.
- VELLUM_TRUSTED_PROXIES is a CIDR list. X-Forwarded-For is honoured only
when RemoteAddr is inside it, and the chain is walked right-to-left so
the first address that is not itself a trusted proxy wins. Everything to
its left was appended by a client we do not control, so a spoofed
leftmost entry is discarded.
- VELLUM_PUBLIC_URL is the external origin. CookieSecure now defaults to
true when it is https://, so a TLS deployment that forgets
VELLUM_COOKIE_SECURE no longer ships a plaintext session cookie.
- A malformed CIDR fails the boot rather than being skipped: silently
dropping a proxy network widens the trust boundary, which is the exact
failure this setting exists to prevent.
ClientIP became a method on Authenticator so it can see the trusted set,
which is why handlers.go and main.go changed as well.
Verified red-green: neutering the trusted-peer path fails five ClientIP
tests, including the spoofed-leftmost case.
Known gap, pre-existing and not fixed here: this limiter still covers only
/api/v1/auth/login. Jellyfin AuthenticateByName and Subsonic auth call
auth.Authenticate with no limiting, so the same brute force is available
through those two surfaces.
Migrate only skipped migrations whose number was already applied (n <=
current). Point an older binary at a database a newer binary had already
migrated and it started happily, then read columns that had moved. For a
self-hosted app that is the worst failure mode: silent schema confusion
rather than a clean refusal.
Migrate now errors when PRAGMA user_version exceeds the highest embedded
migration, naming both numbers. Both callers already propagate the error,
so the binary exits at startup instead.
Verified red-green: removing the guard fails
TestMigrateRefusesDatabaseNewerThanBinary.
Docs
- docs/ARCHITECTURE.md: how the pieces fit and why. The request path, the six
enforced layers, the data model, the scanner, the job queue, direct-play
playback, and the three protocol surfaces over one application.
- docs/decisions/: seven ADRs with the alternatives that were rejected —
SQLite-with-a-seam, direct-play-only, mark-missing-never-delete, the modular
monolith, the one item-access chokepoint, the table-backed queue, and
fixed-width timestamps.
- README: the layout section was stale (it predated catalog, home, scanner,
providers, engine, probe, playback, apitoken, arch and the dto packages) and
now lists what exists, plus links to the new docs.
Two real bugs, both found by verifying the docs instead of trusting them
1. The CLI could not run on a fresh install. `Config.Validate` created the data
and config directories, but the CLI never called it, so `vellum user add` —
the recovery path when you are locked out — failed with "unable to open
database file" until the server had booted at least once. Split the directory
creation into `Config.EnsureDirs`, call it from the CLI, and keep the media
root check out of it: an admin command must not fail because a library is
unmounted. The CLI tests now point DBPath inside DataDir, exactly as
LoadConfig derives it, so they exercise the fresh-install path; removing
EnsureDirs fails three of them.
2. A fresh clone could not build at all. `//go:embed all:dist` fails to compile
when web/dist is absent, and web/.gitignore expected a `dist/.gitkeep` that
was never created. Added it, so a clone builds and the server logs
"web UI not embedded; run the frontend build to include it" — the intended
behaviour for someone who only wants the API.
Also: the httpapi tests depended on a built frontend and FAILED rather than
skipping, so the suite was red on any fresh clone. findAsset and readAsset now
skip with a message naming the missing step. They still RUN when a bundle is
present (verified: zero skips here), so they have not been quietly disabled.
Verified from a simulated clone of tracked files only: go build exit 0, 25
packages pass, the server boots and applies all 12 migrations, and the CLI
creates a user and takes a backup. gofmt clean, vet exit 0, svelte-check 0/0.
Phase 3 built the seam; nothing stopped it being undone one convenient import at
a time. Two rules, both proven able to fail.
TestDatabaseSQLImportersAreDeclared freezes the blast radius of database/sql.
Twenty packages import it today and that set is now explicit. A new package that
needs its own SQL must be added deliberately, with a reason. The rule also fails
in the other direction — if a listed package stops importing database/sql, the
list must shrink, so it cannot rot into a meaningless allowlist.
TestThreadedConsumersStayOffSQL is the concrete regression guard: internal/
playback was moved onto catalog.Store, and this fails if it reaches for *sql.DB
again.
Both checks read non-test files only, so a package that needs database/sql
purely to build a test database is not forced onto the list.
Proven by breaking each on purpose:
- dropping internal/media from the list -> "imports database/sql but is not
in sqlImporters"
- adding internal/natsort (no SQL) -> "is listed ... but no longer
imports database/sql"
- re-adding database/sql to playback -> "undoes the seam"
All restored afterwards and the files verified unchanged.
Seven arch rules now, each able to fail. gofmt clean, build 0, vet 0, 25
packages pass.
EXPAND ONLY, per the migration order (expand, migrate, verify, contract). No
Postgres implementation, no behaviour change.
internal/catalog now exposes:
type Store interface {
Item / ItemFor / Files / FilesFor / FileByID / FirstFile / FileCount
}
type SQL struct{ db *sql.DB }; func New(db *sql.DB) *SQL
The seven bodies are the old functions moved verbatim. ItemFor still returns the
same ErrNotFound for absent and forbidden, so the security property is
unchanged. A compile-time `var _ Store = (*SQL)(nil)` keeps the implementation
honest.
Deliberately NOT moved: browse lists, home shelves and subsonic album queries.
Those are each package's own presentation concern, and pulling all of them into
the seam is exactly the 186-statement rewrite the seam exists to avoid. The
package doc says so.
Proven substitutable, not just declared: store_test.go implements a fake Store
in memory with no database at all and drives a caller through the interface. A
seam nobody can substitute proves nothing.
The agent's own risk note was right and I acted on it: the seam only pays off
once something actually threads it, and initially nothing did. So internal/
playback — the smallest consumer — now takes a catalog.Store instead of *sql.DB
and is wired with catalog.New(db) at the composition point. It has no database
reference left outside a comment. The remaining consumers (media, jellyfin,
subsonic, metadata) still call the package-level wrappers; threading them is
mechanical, and I would rather do it deliberately than in one sweep.
Verified: gofmt clean, build exit 0, vet exit 0, 25 packages pass, arch rules
pass. End to end against a running server: /playback/resolve still returns
vcodec:hevc for html5 and engine mpv when mpv is offered, an unknown item 404s,
/home and Jellyfin /Items still answer.
Known gap, unchanged by this commit: internal/arch does not enforce "new code
must not take *sql.DB", so the seam can erode by drift. That rule would be the
natural next step if this is to hold.
internal/jellyfin is the most client-visible surface in the tree — real Jellyfin
apps parse its JSON — and it had zero test files. Phase 2 had just moved its
DTOs, so this closes the gap before the next refactor.
Coverage: internal/jellyfin 0.0% -> 35.7%, internal/jellyfin/dto -> 68.9%.
The tests, and why each exists:
- Credential forms. X-Emby-Token, X-MediaBrowser-Token, ?api_key= and
Authorization: MediaBrowser Token="...". The query form matters most: <video>
and <audio> elements cannot set headers, so a client that can only use
?api_key= must still authenticate.
- Grant scoping. A user with no grants sees zero items, and an item they cannot
read returns a response BYTE-IDENTICAL to one that does not exist. A 403 would
confirm the library is there and leak its existence. The test asserts the two
responses are indistinguishable, not merely both non-200.
- The transcode refusal. A client that disables both direct play and direct
stream is demanding a transcode, and gets ErrorCode NoCompatibleStream rather
than a TranscodingUrl that would never resolve. The normal path is asserted to
advertise SupportsTranscoding FALSE, because a client told otherwise waits
forever for a stream that never starts.
- Streaming with ONLY ?api_key= plus a Range header returns 206 with a correct
Content-Range and the right bytes, and a token cannot stream a file it cannot
read.
- AuthenticateByName mints a token that then authenticates, and returns no token
for bad credentials.
- DTO mapping: exact JSON key set, RunTimeTicks as ms x 10000, id round-trip,
ImageTags only with a cover, and golden JSON for both the item and the media
source.
Both halves are proven able to FAIL, because a test that cannot fail is
decoration:
- flipping SupportsTranscoding to true fails TestMediaSourceNeverTranscodes
- disabling the grant check in catalog.LoadFor fails
TestGrantScopingIsIndistinguishableFromAbsent AND TestStreamRefusesUnreadableItem
Both were restored afterwards and the non-test files verified byte-unchanged.
Process note: the agent for this task failed twice (HTTP 400) and left a test
file that did not compile — a bad slices.Delete call and a helper it never
wrote. I fixed those, corrected one wrong expectation (a video item legitimately
carries MediaType; the test's want-list omitted it), and wrote the handler tests
myself since that was the half that never got reached.
gofmt clean, build exit 0, vet exit 0, 25 packages pass, svelte-check 0/0.
Four extractions, each chosen because the two halves have different callers,
different failure modes or different testing needs. Not a line-count exercise.
internal/home out of internal/media
- media serves item RESOURCES (detail, file, cover, progress); home computes
AGGREGATES (the five shelves). The 2328-line package was doing both.
- media keeps POST /items/{id}/view because it is item-scoped and must stay in
the package that authorizes the item; it imports home.RecordView for that one
thing. home does not import media.
- Verified live: all five shelves non-empty, and two consecutive /home calls
return different explore ids, which is the non-determinism the Explore rewrite
exists for.
internal/scanner out of internal/library
- The scanner walks the filesystem and reconciles; library CRUD is an admin HTTP
surface. Different callers (a job vs a request), different failure modes.
- The registry deliberately STAYED in internal/library: three of its four callers
are not the scanner (modules register types, handlers serve the list, metadata
reads the group mode, subsonic calls CleanTitle). It is a property of the kind,
not of the scan. The one genuinely scanner-owned helper became
library.ExtensionsFor.
- Two tests moved with the code rather than being rewritten; they now exercise
the boundary by calling library.ListMissing across it.
- Verified live: first scan updates, rescan reports unchanged=N, so change
detection still short-circuits.
internal/providers out of internal/metadata
- Providers talk to third-party APIs; the enrich job owns the matching policy and
the database writes. The split's whole point is that a provider is testable
WITHOUT a database, so a DB-free test was added and OpenLibrary gained a
BaseURL override to make it possible.
- providers imports zero internal packages — a true leaf.
- The matching policy (searchTitle, artistHint, pickBest) is untouched. It exists
because real false matches were found.
dto packages out of internal/jellyfin and internal/subsonic
- The wire types and their mapping are now separate from the handler logic, so
the contract with clients we do not control is reviewable on its own.
- Both dto packages are PURE: zero references to sql.DB or net/http, verified by
grep. That is what makes them reviewable.
- No field name, tag or error code changed.
internal/arch did its job: it failed the build twice during this phase, once for
each new package that was not yet placed in a layer. That is the rule working,
not an obstacle.
Verified: gofmt clean, build exit 0, vet exit 0, 23 packages pass, svelte-check
0/0, and end to end against a running server — home shelves, a queued scan
reporting unchanged, Jellyfin /Items, and Subsonic ping.
Process note: one agent (dto) stopped mid-task and left the tree red — the dto
packages unlayered and its test still referencing constants that had moved. The
arch test caught it immediately. I finished it by hand: exported constant
references in the test, and both dto packages placed at layer 3.
Still open from Phase 1: internal/jellyfin has no test files, catalog is
item-centric while Subsonic is file-first, and subsonic loadAlbum now scopes to
the item's own library.
Motivation, from the evidence rather than from taste. Five packages each
implemented "load an item, then check the caller may read it": media, comics,
games, jellyfin (with its own dbItem type and its own SQL), and subsonic. Five
copies of one authorization rule means four can drift, and the failure mode is
not a crash — it is silently serving somebody a library they were never granted.
One implementation is one thing to review.
internal/catalog now owns item and file access, and the access check.
LoadUnchecked(ctx, db, id) -- no access check; jobs and tests only
LoadFor(ctx, db, u, id) -- load AND enforce the grant, in one call
Files / FilesFor / FileByID / FirstFile / FileCount
The unchecked variant is deliberately named so that reaching for it by accident
is hard: it is the dangerous call, so it should not have the friendlier name.
This came from the interface-design rule that a good interface makes the right
thing easy and the wrong thing hard.
The security property is tested, not asserted: a forbidden item and an absent
item return byte-identical errors, so no handler can leak the existence of
another user's library through a 403. That is now enforced in one place.
Migrated all five surfaces onto it. media, comics, games and ebooks went from
four duplicate loaders to zero. jellyfin's dbItem and loadDBItem are gone.
subsonic's per-item authorization moved while its album/artist aggregate
projections stayed put, because grouping items into albums is a presentation
concern, not a data-access one. The remaining raw SQL everywhere is browse and
aggregate queries; no per-item load decides access any more.
internal/arch enforces the layering instead of documenting it. Five rules, each
proven able to fail by deliberately breaking it:
- no upward imports across six explicit layers
- internal/core may depend only on migrations
- internal/catalog must not know about HTTP, or it stops being reusable
- modules must not import each other
- every package must be placed in a layer, so the map cannot go stale
A test that only ever passes is decoration, so each rule was verified by
introducing the violation and confirming the failure.
Verified: gofmt clean, go build ./... exit 0, go vet exit 0, 20 packages pass,
svelte-check 0/0. End to end against a running server: the vellum API serves
item detail with codec facts, an unknown item 404s, Jellyfin AuthenticateByName
mints a token and /Items browses, and Subsonic ping returns status ok. The
subsonic migration was additionally A/B'd byte-identical against the previous
implementation across ~15 endpoints, and Jellyfin/Subsonic both still return the
same error for a forbidden item as for an absent one.
Known follow-ups, recorded rather than silently skipped:
- internal/jellyfin has no test files at all. Its wire contract is the most
client-visible surface in the tree and is now verified only by hand.
- catalog is item-centric, but Subsonic addresses songs file-first (mf-<id>),
so it resolves file to item through its own projection. A catalog lookup
that takes a file id would close that.
- subsonic loadAlbum now scopes the projection to the item's own library
rather than all visible audio libraries. Equivalent by construction, since
an item's kind tracks its library's kind, but a hand-edited mismatch would
differ.
Vellum now speaks two foreign protocols, so the clients people already own can
use it. Both are translation layers over queries that already exist, and both go
through the same grant chokepoint as the web app — a token is a second way to be
a user, never a second set of permissions.
Shared foundation (coordinator, written before dispatch)
- migrations/0012_api_tokens.sql + internal/apitoken. Both protocols need a
credential that is not the session cookie, and letting two agents each invent
a token table would have produced two incompatible ones.
- The table stores two shapes for a real reason: a Jellyfin token is a bearer
value so only its hash is kept, while a Subsonic key must be recoverable
because verifying `t` means computing md5(key + salt) server-side. token_plain
is therefore the one column in the schema holding a usable credential. It is a
generated random secret, never a user password, and it is revocable.
Wave 9 - Jellyfin
- /System/Info/Public, /Users/AuthenticateByName, /Users/Me, /Users/{id},
/Items, /Users/{id}/Items, /Items/{id}, /Items/{id}/Images/Primary,
/Items/{id}/PlaybackInfo, /Videos/{id}/stream, /Audio/{id}/stream,
/Sessions/Playing{,/Progress,/Stopped}.
- Auth accepts X-Emby-Token, X-MediaBrowser-Token, ?api_key=, and
Authorization: MediaBrowser Token="...". The ?api_key= form is the one that
matters: <video> elements cannot set headers.
- Honest about the one thing Vellum cannot do. PlaybackInfo reports
SupportsDirectPlay/SupportsDirectStream true and SupportsTranscoding FALSE,
with a DirectStreamUrl carrying the api_key. A client that disables both
direct modes is demanding a transcode and is refused with ErrorCode
"NoCompatibleStream" — rather than handed a TranscodingUrl that would never
resolve, which is how a client hangs forever.
Wave 10 - Subsonic
- /rest/{method} dispatch with ping, getLicense, getMusicFolders, getIndexes,
getArtists/getArtist/getAlbum, getMusicDirectory, getSong, search3, stream,
getCoverArt, getAlbumList2, getRandomSongs, scrobble, getUser, getPlaylists,
plus GET /api/v1/subsonic/credentials to hand a user their key.
- Auth via t=md5(key+salt), p=key, constant-time comparison. A bad credential
returns HTTP 200 with the envelope status "failed" and error code 40 — NOT an
HTTP 401. Subsonic clients read the envelope, and getting this wrong is the
single most common integration failure in that protocol.
- stream supports format=raw and never invokes ffmpeg.
Coordinator wired both into main.go (the line agents were told to leave alone)
and verified against real requests.
Verified end to end, 18 packages pass, gofmt/vet clean, svelte-check 0/0:
- Jellyfin: discovery, AuthenticateByName minting a token, /Items reporting 18,
PlaybackInfo showing SupportsTranscoding=false, and a Range request to
/Videos/{id}/stream using ONLY ?api_key= returning 206 with Content-Range.
- Subsonic: ping as JSON and XML, md5(key+salt) auth succeeding, and a bad token
returning the failed envelope with code 40.
- Scoping, both protocols, with a genuinely non-admin user: 0 items, 404 on an
admin-only item, 404 on its stream, 0 music folders; admin still sees 18.
- The SPA is not shadowed by the root-mounted compat paths: /, /healthz and
/api/v1/version all still answer correctly.
Both agents failed with an HTTP 400 at the REPORT stage, not during the work;
their files were complete and compile, so the work was salvaged and verified
here rather than redone.
Wave 7 - engines, chosen per file by the client's own capabilities
- internal/engine: a registry. html5 is built in and declares a CONSERVATIVE
browser baseline (h264/vp8/vp9/av1, deliberately no hevc and no mpeg4, because
that is what was measured). mpv, vlc and mdk are registered as native engines
declaring the broad support those libraries really have.
- The server never declares a file playable. It reports what is in the file and
matches it against the engines the CLIENT declares. Proven:
engines=["html5"] -> playable=false engine=null reason=vcodec:hevc
engines=["html5","mpv"] -> playable=true engine=mpv
Same file, different answer, because the client offered a different engine.
That is what makes adding a native client a registration rather than a rewrite.
- internal/playback: GET /playback/engines and POST /playback/resolve, behind
auth and the same grant chokepoint. An unreadable item is 404, not 403.
- web/src/lib/capabilities.ts: uses navigator.mediaCapabilities.decodingInfo(),
which returns {supported, smooth, powerEfficient}. That is real client-hardware
detection and it distinguishes "cannot decode" from "can decode but it will
stutter and drain the battery". Feature-detected; degrades to the server
baseline rather than throwing.
- VideoPlayer consults the server as an ADVISORY only. The element remains the
source of truth: the server's note appears first, then the element's own
confirmation replaces it once videoWidth proves the answer. Verified on HEVC —
"Playback may not work here" at 0-906ms, "Video cannot play here" from ~1208ms.
Wave 8 - missing files: visibility and an explicit purge
- migrations/0011 adds missing_since to media_items and media_files.
- It is written only on the TRANSITION into missing, so the age says when the
file first vanished rather than the last rescan. Proven byte-identical across a
rescan, and cleared when a file is restored.
- GET /api/v1/missing (grant-scoped) and POST /api/v1/libraries/{id}/purge
(admin only). The purge deletes only items that are missing AND have no
present file, and its cascade into progress/item_people/item_views/game_saves
is enumerated in a comment — that cascade is exactly why deletion is never
automatic. Proven: 19 items -> 18, only the missing one, the non-missing item
untouched and its files intact, second purge returns 0.
- MissingFiles.svelte in the Manage nav: title, kind, library, path, human age,
and a per-library Purge behind a confirmation that names the count and says
progress cannot be regenerated.
Coordinator wired playback.NewHandlers into main.go (the one line agents were
told to leave alone).
Verified end to end: 17 packages pass, gofmt/vet clean, svelte-check 0/0, and
every claim above checked against the running server.
Direct play only. The server is a headless GPU-less Xeon: nothing is ever
transcoded or remuxed. A file either plays in the client or it does not.
Measured, not assumed (ffmpeg-generated files with known codecs, played through
Vellum's own stream endpoint in Chrome 155 / Linux):
mp4 h264+aac plays mkv h264+aac PLAYS <- container is fine
mov h264+aac plays webm vp9/opus plays
mp4 av1+opus plays webm vp8/vorbis plays
mp4 hevc+aac AUDIO ONLY, videoWidth stays 0, no error
mkv hevc+flac AUDIO ONLY
avi mpeg4+mp3 fails outright
All seven audio formats play. Two conclusions drive the design: codec matters
and container barely does (mkv+h264 plays, mp4+HEVC does not), and canPlayType
is unreliable in both directions — it says "no" for mov+h264 (which plays) and
"maybe" for mkv+hevc (whose video never decodes).
Therefore playability is a property of the CLIENT, not the file. The server
never declares a file playable; it reports codec facts and each client decides.
That is what makes adding mpv/libvlc/MDK later a matter of registering an engine
rather than re-architecting.
Wave 4 - audio depth
- New MusicPlayer.svelte: real queue, shuffle that walks a fixed permutation
(so "previous" means something and nothing repeats early), repeat off/all/one,
per-track rows, album art, next-track preload.
- AudiobookPlayer: MediaSession (OS media keys + lock screen), playback speed
that SURVIVES a chapter change and persists, sleep timer with countdown that a
manual pause cancels, keyboard shortcuts, next-chapter preload.
- Shared mediaSession.ts written by the coordinator before dispatch so both
players consume one implementation instead of inventing two.
Wave 5 - ffprobe facts
- internal/probe (ffprobe wrapper, optional dependency), migration 0010 adding
vcodec/acodec/width/height/probed_at to media_files, scanner hook, API fields.
- Probing runs only for NEW or CHANGED files and BEFORE the write transaction
opens, so it can never hold SQLite's write lock and a rescan never becomes a
full-library ffprobe sweep. Proven: 797ms probing scan, then 1ms rescan with
probed_at byte-identical.
- ffprobe skips attached_pic so an mp3 with cover art reports no video codec.
- Fixed a real hole: .avi is in the video registry but had no MIME entry, so it
was served as application/octet-stream and could never play.
Wave 6 - the video player
- VideoPlayer.svelte with resume, progress + keepalive final flush, MediaSession,
keyboard shortcuts, multi-file picker, and codec facts shown.
- The honest path is the feature: an HEVC file makes Chrome play audio over a
blank frame with no error, which is the worst possible outcome. The player
detects it and says so, naming the codec and pointing at clients that can.
Coordinator fix to Wave 6: the agent's detection hung off `loadedmetadata`, but
an explicit `type` the browser cannot satisfy makes it reject the source during
selection, so NEITHER loadedmetadata NOR error fires — and the player showed a
working-looking 0:00 with a Play button, exactly the silently-broken state the
component exists to prevent. Added a load watchdog: if the element says nothing
within 2.5s, the source was rejected and the honest notice is shown. Verified
per file afterwards (h264/mkv play at 640 wide; hevc and mpeg4 show their
notices).
Verified end to end, not just compiled: 15 packages pass (including the new
internal/probe), gofmt/vet clean, svelte-check 0/0, and every claim above checked
against a running server. Note the demo's own mp3s are 100 KB of random bytes and
cannot decode; the audio players were proven against generated real audio instead.
Authors are searchable (internal/search, migrations/0009)
- The FTS index covered only title and path, so typing an artist or author
found nothing even though people/item_people already held the credits.
- Rather than a second index, the names are denormalised into a real
media_items.authors column, so the existing external-content FTS and its
triggers keep doing the work; item_people/people triggers recompute it, and
the media_items UPDATE trigger re-indexes automatically.
- Verified: searching "daft punk" now returns Random Access Memories, and so
does the partial "punk".
- The agent found and worked around a real FTS5 external-content bug: on an
UPGRADE the backfill UPDATE fires the delete trigger for rowids not yet in
the fresh index, raising "database disk image is malformed". A rebuild before
the backfill fixes it. This would have broken existing databases while a
fresh install looked fine.
gzip for the SPA (internal/httpapi/static.go)
- 456 KB of JS and 31 KB of CSS were served uncompressed on every cold load.
- Scoped to the embedded SPA assets only, never API or media: compressing a
Range response would break seeking, and wrapping every response would undo
Wave 2's Flusher/ReaderFrom forwarding.
- Compresses only when the client accepts gzip, the response is a compressible
type, there is no Range header, and nothing already set Content-Encoding.
Sets Vary: Accept-Encoding and drops the now-wrong Content-Length.
- Verified by sha256 round-trip (identity vs gzip-decompressed are identical),
and by confirming a Range request still returns 206 with no Content-Encoding.
JS 351,835 -> 108,794 bytes (69% smaller); CSS 80% smaller.
epub.js is code-split (Reader.svelte)
- It was a static import, so ~350 KB was downloaded by everyone on first load
even though most never open an ebook. Now loaded on demand.
- Main bundle 458 KB -> 112 KB (gzipped 149 KB -> 39.5 KB).
- Verified at runtime, which pnpm check cannot: only the main bundle loads
initially, the epubjs chunk is fetched when a book is opened, and the reader
still renders.
Home screen tests (internal/media)
- Coverage 23.4% -> 50.2%. (The 17.9% quoted in the brief was a stale reading;
the agent measured the real baseline by moving its own files aside.)
- Covers the five shelves, counts, Explore's invariants (visibility, no
duplicates, every kind represented, varies across calls, wrap-around),
the list offset/limit/total contract, MostViewed ordering, and — most
importantly — grant scoping, which is the security chokepoint.
Fixed a bug the tests found: Suggestions seeded from revoked libraries
- topEngagement selected the user's most recent progress row with no library
filter, so progress from a library whose grant had been revoked still steered
the home screen — a visible item was labelled "More books" based on content
the user could no longer read. Returned items were always correctly scoped, so
this was an information-flow gap rather than a content leak.
- Now scoped to visible libraries, and the test that pinned the old behaviour
flipped to assert the correct reason.
gofmt/vet clean, 14 packages pass, media tests run 3x for flakiness.
TouchSession throttle (internal/auth)
- Middleware wrote sessions.last_seen on EVERY authenticated request, taking
SQLite's single write lock each time. For media that is severe: one seek in
an audio file fires several Range requests, each taking the write lock and
competing with the scanner and progress saves.
- Now touched at most once per 5 minutes, decided from the LastSeen already
loaded by SessionByToken, so no extra query. A zero interval degrades to the
old per-request behaviour, so a hand-built Authenticator cannot silently stop
updating.
- Verified end to end with an AFTER UPDATE trigger: 20 requests now cause 0
session writes, down from 20.
Response writer forwarding (internal/httpapi)
- statusRecorder wrapped every ResponseWriter but implemented only Write and
WriteHeader, so it did not implement http.Flusher. That silently disabled
early flushing (progressive audio/video) and io.ReaderFrom, which is what
lets io.Copy use sendfile for multi-GB files. Now forwards Flush, Hijack and
ReadFrom, and WriteHeader is idempotent.
Security headers (internal/httpapi)
- Added nosniff, X-Frame-Options: DENY, Referrer-Policy and a CSP. Outermost in
the chain so a recovered panic's 500 still carries them.
- CORRECTION to an earlier claim: I said a malicious EPUB was stored XSS.
That was wrong. epub.js sets iframe sandbox to "allow-same-origin" and only
appends "allow-scripts" when settings.allowScriptedContent is true, which
defaults to false and Reader.svelte never sets. EPUB content cannot execute
script. The CSP is still worth having as defence in depth, but that specific
justification does not hold.
Final flush on teardown (AudiobookPlayer, Reader)
- The last playback/reading position was saved with a fire-and-forget fetch in
onDestroy, which the browser cancels on navigate-away — losing exactly the
thing worth persisting. Now persisted via fetch with keepalive: true, wired
to pagehide and visibilitychange(hidden), latched so the overlapping events
fire one request, and reset when the page becomes visible again so a bfcache
restore still flushes later. sendBeacon was not usable: it is POST-only and
progress is PUT-only.
- Also removed the queueMicrotask track-swap race in AudiobookPlayer: play() is
now driven by onLoadedMetadata once the new src has actually loaded.
Honest readers (Reader, ComicReader)
- registry.go advertises .mobi/.azw3/.fb2 under ebooks, but every ebooks item
was handed to epub.js, which cannot parse them. Now only .epub uses epub.js;
other containers show a message naming the format plus a download link. Items
stay catalogued and downloadable rather than silently vanishing.
- .cbr/.rar comics say the archive format is unsupported instead of surfacing
the server's raw 422 (the server reads zip only).
Verified in a real browser, not just compiled: all six reader surfaces render
(epub iframe, cbz images, audio element, photo, pdf canvas) with zero CSP
violations; .mobi shows the honest message with no epub.js iframe. gofmt/vet
clean, 14 packages pass, svelte-check 0/0.
Known issue, NOT introduced here and NOT fixed: the EPUB reader logs
"Error: No Element Provided" x3 and a TypeError in epub.js injectIdentifier
(doc.getElementsByTagName("head")[0] undefined). Proven pre-existing by A/B
against c50b3cf, and not caused by the test file (spec-correct XHTML) or by
caching (cold browser). Non-fatal: the book still renders. Needs its own
investigation.
A 50k-file library used to wedge the database. This wave fixes the four
reasons why, plus a timestamp-ordering bug the work exposed.
Chunked scans (internal/library/scan.go)
- One transaction wrapped the whole reconciliation, holding SQLite's single
write lock for the entire scan. Now 500 groups per transaction, and the two
missing-file passes are batched too.
- Verified: a 20,000-file scan reports partial progress (scanned=1500 mid-scan)
and a concurrent progress save returns 200 throughout. Under the old code
that save blocked for the whole scan.
- Behaviour change: a scan is no longer all-or-nothing. A crash now leaves a
consistent partial scan. The scan is idempotent, so re-running finishes it.
- res.Errors is capped at 100 (a broken mount used to append one string per
file, then serialise the lot into the job row); the overflow is counted.
Concurrent job workers (internal/jobs/jobs.go)
- Run() was single-threaded, so a scan stalled every enrichment job behind it.
Now 4 workers with jittered idle waits.
- Handlers run concurrently, so Register/lookup take an RWMutex, and a
panicking handler is recovered and marked failed rather than killing a worker
and stranding a row in 'running'.
- RecoverStale() requeues jobs left 'running' by a dead process; called at boot
from main.go. Previously such a job stayed 'running' forever and the UI
polled it forever.
Explore (internal/media/discover.go)
- Full-scanned and sorted the whole library on every home load, and was
deterministic, so it showed the same 30 items every visit. Now a per-kind
fair-share id range scan with a random start, wrap-around, dedup and
interleaving. The doc comment claimed per-kind sampling before; now it does.
Indexes (migrations/0008_query_indexes.sql)
- Benchmarked with ANALYZE over 60k items: browse page 1 13.37ms -> 0.03ms
(484x, full scan -> covering index), deep page 8x, recently added 3.2x.
- A candidate index for the Continue shelf was built, measured and REJECTED:
the planner never chose it because `finished = 0` selects the majority of a
user's rows, so it had no selectivity and would have cost a write on every
progress save. Recorded in the migration rather than shipped as dead weight.
Canonical timestamps (internal/core/stamp.go)
- time.RFC3339Nano trims trailing zeros, so its fraction width varies and the
strings are not lexicographically sortable: ".5Z" > ".55Z" as strings though
.500s < .550s. That broke every ORDER BY <timestamp> and MAX(timestamp),
including the Continue shelf and Most Viewed. It was wrong even in columns
written 100% by Go, so it was not a cross-format issue.
- All 14 write sites now use core.Stamp, matching SQLite's own default format
exactly. Read paths are untouched: RFC3339Nano parses both shapes, so
existing rows keep working.
Also: busy_timeout 5s -> 15s. Chunked scans still delay a concurrent write, and
measured tail latency on a first scan of 15k new files reached 3.3s, leaving
almost no margin at 5s. Waiting beats failing with SQLITE_BUSY and losing a
playback position. A 10ms inter-batch yield was implemented, measured, found to
have no effect distinguishable from noise (overlapping ranges), and removed.
Verified end to end, not just compiled: orphan recovery logged at boot, scan
returns 202 in 0.7ms, Explore varies across loads, concurrent writes survive a
scan. gofmt/vet clean, 14 packages pass, -race clean on the queue, svelte-check
0/0, fresh install applies all 8 migrations.
Five tasks, four delegated to agents on disjoint files and one on the critical
path. Board and verification log: ~/.opencode/plan/vellum-beta-tasks.md
T1 Async scans (coordinator)
- migration 0007 adds ref_id + result to jobs, indexed by (kind, ref_id, id),
so a job can be found by what it operates on and can report back.
- jobs: EnqueueRef, JobID(ctx) so a handler can attach a result, SetResult.
- POST /libraries/{id}/scan now enqueues and returns 202; a real library takes
longer than any request timeout, and a hanging request looks like a broken
server. GET /libraries/{id}/scan/status reports the latest run.
- Libraries.svelte polls and shows "Scanning…" instead of freezing.
T2 Admin CLI (agent)
- internal/cli: `user add|passwd|list`, `backup <path>` via VACUUM INTO, with
tests. Wired into main.go, which the coordinator kept.
T3 Deploy (agent)
- compose.yml now mounts all six media kinds read-only with :z and carries the
metadata env keys. DEPLOY.md covers volumes, SELinux, admin bootstrap, TLS,
backup and upgrade.
T4 Pagination (agent)
- GET /items takes offset and returns total; Browse loads 60 at a time with
"Load more" and "Showing X of Y" instead of silently truncating at 300.
T5 Password change UI (agent)
- A Password section in Settings with validation, busy and success states.
Verified end to end: scan returns 202 in 0.7 ms and polls to done; the CLI
created a user, changed a password, and produced a complete 240 KB backup while
the server ran; pagination reports total 8 and pages correctly; compose parses
with every mount :z. go vet and 14 test packages pass; svelte-check 0/0.
The landing screen now reads as a product rather than a list.
- migration 0006: item_views, per user. "Most viewed" is personal — what I
re-read is not what you re-read. Counted when an item is opened in a reader,
so the number means consumed, not merely fetched.
- Suggestions: unstarted items related to what the user has been consuming —
same author first, then same kind, then recent as a floor. Each carries the
reason it was chosen ("More by Daft Punk"), because a suggestion nobody can
understand is noise.
- Explore: a mixed sample across every kind, excluding in-progress items so the
zone is discovery rather than a repeat.
- Home fetches all five shelves in one request; the screen never pops in.
- web: Shelf gained subtitle/badge support, Card gained a subtitle, and the
home renders four shelves plus a wrapping Explore grid.
Three bugs found and fixed while verifying:
- Continue showed a multi-track audiobook once per chapter. GROUP BY item_id
with MAX(updated_at) picks one card per item (SQLite takes the bare columns
from the row that produced the max).
- Suggestions and Explore passed their SQL arguments in the wrong order: the IN
list precedes the user id in those queries, so a user id was being bound as a
library id. Covered by a scoping test that would have caught it.
- The sidebar lost its media types on a cold, logged-out load. bootstrap()
fetched media types inside a Promise.all with /auth/me, so the expected 401
rejected the whole thing and nothing refetched after login. Media types are
public and now load independently.
The RomM replacement.
- registry: a games media type with ~35 ROM extensions across NES, SNES, GB/GBA,
N64, NDS, Genesis/Master System/Game Gear, PC Engine, Neo Geo Pocket,
WonderSwan, Atari, Coleco, Intellivision, and PlayStation.
- games: platform detection from the file extension, mapping each to an
EmulatorJS core. Platforms with no browser core are recognised but marked
not-playable so the UI offers a download instead of a broken player.
- migration 0005: game_saves keyed by (user, item, slot). Save states are user
data, not media — two people playing the same ROM keep their own progress.
- save endpoints with a 16 MiB cap and a validated slot name; the upload is
read through a LimitReader so an unbounded body is refused rather than
buffered.
- igdb provider: Twitch client-credentials flow with the token cached for its
~2 month lifetime, Apicalypse query body, and cover URLs normalised from
protocol-relative t_thumb to https t_cover_big.
- searchTitle: strips "(USA)", "[!]", "(Rev 1)" and similar release tags before
searching. "Sonic the Hedgehog (USA)" matched nothing; "Sonic the Hedgehog"
matches immediately. Stored titles keep the original.
- web: GamePlayer embeds EmulatorJS and adds Load/Save-to-server buttons.
Verified live against IGDB: Sonic matched (id 316900) with real cover art; a
4 KB save uploaded, listed, downloaded byte-identical, and deleted.
- comicvine provider for comics. ComicVine has no keyless tier, so the
provider is only registered when VELLUM_COMICVINE_API_KEY is set; without it
the server logs a note and comic enrichment completes as a no-op rather than
erroring.
- BaseURL is injectable so the response parsing is covered by a test against a
local server: candidate mapping, the required User-Agent, and the
status_code=100 invalid-key case (ComicVine returns HTTP 200 for that).
- descriptions are stripped of ComicVine's embedded HTML before storage.
Verified against a fake ComicVine server, and live that a comics library
enriches cleanly with no key configured.
- musicbrainz provider: keyless, with the required descriptive User-Agent and
a 1 req/s throttle so the provider cannot get us blocked. Covers come from
the Cover Art Archive by release id.
- artistHint: directory-grouped items are stored as "Artist/Album", so the
parent directory is used as the artist when querying. Without it the search
for "Random Access Memories" matched an unrelated release by another artist.
- pickBest: providers return fuzzy matches, and taking candidates[0] blindly
is how an album gets the wrong artist. A candidate is only accepted when its
normalised title corresponds to the item's; otherwise the provider is
recorded as notfound and the next one is tried.
Verified live: after the fix the album resolves to Daft Punk, 2013, and the
correct release id, with real cover art. Before the fix it matched a Franz
Kirmann release.
- PdfReader renders PDFs to canvas with page navigation and page-number
progress, reusing the same integer progress model as comics.
- Reader routes by file container, not media kind, so a PDF in a comics
library and a PDF ebook both open in the PDF reader.
- pdf.js is dynamically imported: the main bundle stays 443 kB and the 474 kB
pdf chunk plus 1.26 MB worker load only when a PDF is actually opened.
- comics cover extractor now only handles zip archives. A PDF in a comics
library is a valid item but not a zip, so it returns no cover instead of
logging an error on every request.
- fixed the page scale to leave slack for the vertical scrollbar, which was
otherwise forcing a horizontal scrollbar on tall pages.
Verified live: a 3-page PDF renders, navigates, and reports 33% progress.
The app looked like an admin panel. This is the product people actually see
when they open their library.
- Home: a landing screen with a Continue shelf (progress bars, straight from
the progress table) and per-type shelves of recent additions. One request
feeds it, so it does not pop in piece by piece.
- Browse: cover grid per media type with type chips, plus browse-all. Powered
by a new GET /items that lists across every visible library, filtered by
kind, through the same access chokepoint.
- Item page: cover, kind, title, authors, progress, a primary action that says
Continue when you have started, description, and the file list for
multi-file items. Cards now open the item page rather than jumping straight
into a reader.
- Search: results grouped by media type, cover-forward.
- Navigation moved from "libraries" to "media types" — you browse Ebooks, not
"the Ebooks folder". Libraries became an admin concern.
- Design system: dark by default, cover-forward, one accent, tighter type
scale, horizontal shelves, skeleton loaders.
- media: GET /home, GET /items, and authors on item detail.
Verified by screenshot in a live instance: home shelves, browse grid, and item
page all render correctly.
- photos: generates a downscaled JPEG thumbnail per image, because serving a
folder of 12-megapixel originals to a grid is unusable on a TV box. Uses
CatmullRom scaling via golang.org/x/image; decodes jpeg/png/gif/webp.
- an undecodable format returns no thumbnail rather than an error, so the grid
falls back to a placeholder.
- images already smaller than the 512px ceiling are passed through untouched.
- library items endpoint now returns library_id, which the viewer needs to
find its siblings for navigation.
- web: PhotoViewer with keyboard and button navigation within the library.
Verified: 900x1200 PNG thumbnailed to a 512-long-edge JPEG and served;
unit tests assert exact dimensions, aspect preservation, and that non-images
produce no thumbnail without erroring.
A book is a folder of chapters, not a file. The scanner gained a grouping
mode so a directory of tracks becomes one item with ordered files.
- registry: MediaType.Group (file | directory). Audiobooks and music group by
directory; everything else stays one item per file.
- scanner: builds groups, upserts one item per group, marks items missing when
their directory disappears, and keeps the file-level added/updated/missing
accounting. Tracks are ordered naturally, so chapter 2 precedes chapter 10.
- natsort: one shared natural-order comparator, now used by both the scanner
and the comics module (which had its own copy).
- media: GET /items/{id}/files/{fileID} streams one specific track. It
verifies the file belongs to the item, so an item id cannot be paired with
another item's file id.
No new module was needed for playback: the polymorphic progress table already
keys on file_id, so per-chapter resume fell out of the existing design. The
web player resumes the exact track and offset.
Verified: 3 chapters grouped into one book titled "Mistborn", natural order,
range request returned 206, mismatched file id 404s, per-track progress
round-trips.
- jobs: a table-backed queue in the same SQLite file. No Redis, no second
process, included in the same backup. claim() is a single UPDATE...RETURNING
so a job cannot run twice even with several workers. Failures back off
exponentially; a missing handler fails permanently rather than retrying a
bug.
- metadata: Provider interface plus Open Library and Google Books (both
keyless). The enricher tries providers in registration order, falls back on
empty, and continues past a provider error.
- migration 0004: metadata_fetch records the attempt, not just the match, so a
rescan does not re-hammer a rate-limited API for an item that will never
match. Errors are always retried; ok/notfound are cached for 30 days.
- enrichment writes provider_ids, updates title/year, links authors through
people/item_people, and downloads the cover as an asset. The cover download
runs outside the transaction: a slow image host must not hold a write lock.
- endpoints: queue enrichment per library, and inspect an item's matches.
- web: Enrich button per library.
Verified live against Open Library: "The Hobbit" matched /works/OL27482W,
title and year 1937 written, a 301x500 JPEG cover downloaded and served.
- migration 0003: an FTS5 index over media_items as an external-content table,
so the index stores no copy of the text. Triggers keep it in sync for every
write path, including the scanner's bulk inserts.
- migrate: splitStatements now tracks BEGIN...END depth, so CREATE TRIGGER
bodies survive as one statement. Without this, the trigger's internal
semicolons would tear it apart.
- search: every whitespace term is quoted before it reaches FTS5. Unquoted
input like a bare quote, a hyphen, or the word OR is valid FTS5 syntax and
would either error or silently change the query's meaning. Tested against a
list of hostile inputs, including a DROP TABLE attempt.
- scoped through the same VisibleLibraryIDs chokepoint; an empty library set
returns nothing, never everything.
- web: search box in the topbar and a results view.
Verified live: finds items across libraries, hostile input returns 200 with no
results, index stays in sync on insert/update/delete.
- comics: reads pages straight out of the archive on demand. No extraction
pass, so a 200-page CBZ is not materialised for a reader who views three
pages. Pages are read into memory and served via http.ServeContent, which
gives Range for free.
- natural page ordering: page2 sorts before page10. Lexical ordering shuffles
a numbered archive, which is the difference between a readable book and a
scrambled one.
- skips __MACOSX and dotfiles; rejects archives with no images.
- cover is the first page.
- media.Item gained ModTime (from the backing file) so page responses carry a
Last-Modified and support conditional GETs.
- web: ComicReader with a bounded prefetch window (two pages each way), page
jump, keyboard nav, and progress stored as a page number.
Verified: 3-page CBZ served in natural order, out-of-range 404, cover from
page 1, progress round-trip. svelte-check 0/0.
The frontend the app needs to be usable at all.
- web/: Svelte 5 + Vite + TypeScript SPA. Login, app shell with per-type nav,
library list/create/scan/delete, item grid with covers, admin user
management, and an epub.js reader that syncs progress.
- Reader resumes by spine index — an integer — which is why the polymorphic
progress table needs no text column.
- Session state uses classic stores in a plain .ts module rather than runes in
a .svelte.ts module, avoiding special module resolution.
- Embedding: web/embed.go embeds web/dist. A committed .gitkeep keeps the
directive valid before the frontend is built, so `go build ./...` never
fails. Unknown non-API paths serve index.html for client routes; /api/* and
/healthz always return JSON and never fall back to HTML.
- Dockerfile builds the UI in a node stage and overlays dist into the Go stage.
- pnpm 12 needs allowBuilds in pnpm-workspace.yaml; esbuild approved, the two
unused transitive scripts explicitly denied so install exits 0.
svelte-check: 0 errors, 0 warnings. Verified served: SPA shell at /, route
fallback, hashed asset, and JSON 404 on /api/*.
- stream: serving goes through http.ServeContent, so Range/If-Range/
If-Modified-Since are correct for every media type by construction
- progress: the polymorphic store. One row per user/item/file; the PK includes
the file so multi-track audiobooks resume per track later. Finished is
inferred when position reaches duration.
- media: generic item endpoints (detail, file, cover, progress, recent). Every
one routes through auth.CanAccessLibrary; an unauthorised item 404s.
- covers: a per-kind extractor registry. Extraction is lazy and recorded in
the assets table. A missing cover is a placeholder, never a 500.
- modules/ebooks: EPUB parsing (container.xml -> OPF -> metadata, spine, cover
with three fallback strategies), cover extraction to /config, and lazy
metadata parsing so parser fixes need no rescan.
Verified against a generated EPUB: title/2 authors/language/publisher/spine,
cover served as PNG, range request returned 206 with correct Content-Range,
progress round-tripped.
- library: CRUD with root-path resolution (absolute, symlink-free, must be
readable). A library name is unique; the root is validated at creation.
- registry: media types declare their extensions; the core never imports a
module. RegisterType is the extension point.
- scanner: walks a root, reconciles media_items/media_files in one
transaction, skips unchanged files by size+mtime, and marks vanished files
missing rather than deleting them (progress is the one thing here that
cannot be regenerated). A single unreadable file never fails a scan.
- migration 0002: `missing` flags on items and files, plus indexes.
- endpoints: media-types, library list/get/create/delete, per-library items,
and scan. Library reads go through the same grant chokepoint as everything
else; an unauthorised library 404s rather than 403s so its existence is not
leaked.
Multi-user from the first migration, as planned.
- auth: argon2id password hashing (PHC encoded, parameters travel with the
hash), opaque session tokens stored only as SHA-256, login rate limiting,
and account enumeration resistance (unknown user hashes anyway)
- sessions: cookie or Bearer auth, HttpOnly + SameSite=Lax, revocation on
password change
- grants: library_grants is the single access-control chokepoint. Admins see
every library; everyone else sees exactly their can_read grants
- bootstrap: VELLUM_ADMIN_USER/PASSWORD create the first admin only on an
empty database. No default password is ever invented.
- httpapi: mounts modules on a shared mux, session middleware innermost
- httpx: shared JSON helpers, strict body decoding
Gate: two users see different libraries. Tests cover that, plus session
expiry, token-at-rest, grant upsert, and the full login/me/logout flow.
Bootstraps Vellum as a single Go binary with one SQLite database.
- core: env-driven config, slog logging, SQLite (WAL) with pooled pragmas,
embedded migration runner keyed on PRAGMA user_version
- migrations/0001_core.sql: identity, media, user state, infra. Media items
are global; all per-user state (progress, favorites, grants) is a join.
One polymorphic progress table covers every media kind.
- httpapi: request-ID, structured request logging, panic recovery, JSON
endpoints for /healthz and /api/v1/version
- multi-arch Dockerfile (pure-Go SQLite, CGO_ENABLED=0) with an entrypoint
that honours PUID/PGID like the rest of the self-hosted stack
- tests for migration idempotency, FK enforcement, WAL, config, middleware
Media does not exist yet. Nothing is exposed beyond health and version.
